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CHAPTER

I

PURPOSE, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

Purpose
This study focuses on the Disability Insurance Program,

initiated in 1956 as part of the Social Security Program.

Dis-

ability insurance has been chosen for analysis since it

provides

a

unique opportunity for determining the importance

of the states within the federal system in the United States.
As will be noted in greater detail in Chapter III, the Dis-

ability Insurance program is totally funded bv the federal

governmenc and, as the name implies, is an insurance oriented
program.

In these particulars

Survivors’

it

is

similar to the Old-Age,

Insurance (OASI) program of which it is

A key corollarv of

a

part.

insurance orientation is that

tlie

peonlo receive benefits only if they qualify.

(This is in

contrast to the welfare orientation where benefits are

awarded on the basis of need.)

Because of the nature of the

program, variations among the states in regard to the per-

centage of claimants granted insurance benefits are supposed
to be nomina]

and to relate only to whether the claimant

covered by the program meets the specifications detailing who
is

entitled to benefits.
Howevcm

,

the administrative implementation of disabi.lity

insurance differs in one fundamental respect
1

Iroj’.i

OASI.

Unlike

2

the latter, the basic decisions regarding who is entitled to

benefits are

inade by

state agencies.

This study proceeds from

the assumption that this arrangemen;. has resulted in the exten-

sion of state influence over the disability program and that
this influence is demonstrated by variance in the allowances

among states.
The purpose of this study then is to determine the

legitimacy of this contention and in so doing to help ascertain what degree of viability the states do have in relationship to the federal government.

If it is possible to conclude

that the states do exercise some influence on the ways deci-

sions are made in this program of disability insurance, then
tlie

prominence of the states should be self-evident, espe-

cially since such influence will be demonstrated using

federally funded program as

a

test case.

If,

a

however, the

results of this analysis suggest that state governments have

little or no influence over this program, then one will have
to place limits on the views held by some that the states

remain significantly important in our federal system.

Hypotheses
In

order to test

tlie

basic hypothesis, i.e., that the

states influence the awarding of benefits to disability

claimants,
and tested.
1.

a

number of subsidiary hypotheses will be advanced
These hypotheses follow:

Variability in the implementation of the Disability

t

^

.

,

,

,

,

3

Insurance program among the states is an inevitable
result of the existing federal system within the
United States in which the states function as semiautonomous polities with active roles to play in
the formulation and implementation of most major

policies

.

The importance of the states in general and v\?ithin
the disability program in particular can be suggested by the history of the establishment of the
program and by the intentions of the policy makers

2.

involved

.

Variability in the disability insurance program is
influenced by socio-economic characteristics within

3.

the states and by the efforts of the state decision-

makers to respond to the needs implied by those
7

cha rac ter i St i cs

Variability in the disability program is related to
the degree of inter-party competition in a state.

4.

Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture
Little, Brown, and Co., 1965); William T Bluhm
Ideologies and Attitudes: Modern Political Culture (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc
1974); Donald J. Devine, The
Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co
1972); Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View
from the States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1972).
(Boston:

.

.

.

,

,

2

See Chapter III below.

3

Thomas Dye, Politic s Economics, and the Public: Polic y
Ou tcomes in the Am e rican Stat es (Chicago: Rand McxNally, 1966);
Und ers t anding Public Policy (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
Inc., 1972); fra Sharkansky, Spending in the Americ an State s
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968).
.

,

^Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs,"
ed.. Poli t ical Research and Political Theory
Austin Ranney
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press)
"Parties in State Politics," in Herbert Jacob and Kennetli V^'ines,
Poli ics in the American Sta tes, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co
1971 ).
in Oliver Garceau,

.

;

9

^

^

^

4

5.

Variability in the disability program is related
to
the degree of voter turnout within a state.

6.

Variability in the disability program is related to
the strength of interest groups within a state.

7.

Variability in the disability program is influenced
by the actions of the decision-makers within a state
and by the organizational framework in which such
decision-makers operate.
Specifically, the following
associations are suggested as relating to state
variations in the implementation of the Disability
Insurance Program;
a.

Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of legislative professionalism in
a

b.

state.

7

Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of gubernatorial effectiveness in
a

state.

Thomas Dye, Politics in States and Communities (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp 66-70; Lester
Milbrath, "Individuals and Government," in Jacob and Vines.
.

^Lewis Froman, "Some Effects of Interest Group Strength
in State Politics," American Political Science Review 60

(December, 1966), 952-962; Harmon L. Zeigler and Michael A.
Baer, Lobbying: Interaction and Influence in American State
Legislatures (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co.,
and Hendrik van Dalen, "Interest Groups in the
1969)
]
States," in Jacob and Vines.
;

7

John G. Grumm, "The Effects of Legislative Structure
on Legislative Performance," in Richard Hofferbert and Ira
Sharka^isky, Sjt ate and Urban Politics: Readings in Comparative
Public Poli cy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971); The
Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, State Legislatures:
An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness (New York; Praeger Publishers
T9TTT.

^Thad Beyle and J. Oliver Williams, ed.. The American
Governor in Behavioral Perspecti ve (New York: Harper and Row, 1972
Joseph A. Schiesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Jacob
and Vines.

.

5

c.

Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of administrative professionalism
in a state.

9

d.

Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of political innovation in a state.

e.

Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of professionalism in the Disability
Determining Units (DDU's), those state agencies
which make the decisions on allowances and denials
of disability benefits to claimants.
DDU professionalism can be further analyzed into the background and qualification of examiners, and length of
service in the DDU's.

M ethodology
In order to test the hypotheses stated above,

of statistical techniques

v^^ill

a

variety

be utilized to determine whether

correlations exist between the variables selected.

Further-

more, material from several interviews conducted in

a

number

of states will also assist in making determinations about the

validity of the hypotheses.

The use of these techniques and

the nature of interviews will be given more emphasis in later

chapters
It

is

necessary and appropriate at this point, however,

to suggest that the overall methodology which will

be utilized

^Ira Sharkansky, "State Administrators in the Political
Process," in Jacob and Vines.

^^Jack Walker, "Innovation in State Politics," in
Jacob and Vines.
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to order the hypotheses presented here is
systems analysis.

Systems analysis is an especially useful model for
analyzing
the variables in this study because it conceptually
incorpor-

ates the variety of factors which have been specified
as

possible influence on disability benefit rates and
presents logical relationships of these factors to the dis-

ability allowance percentages.

In this sense the systems

model is more comprehensive than other models which have been

suggested in the literature, such as the elite-mass model, the
group model, the institutional model, the rationalist model,
or the incrementalist model.

An analysis of the essential

features of each of these other models will demonstrate their

limitations and also point to the general necessity of choosing
the systems model.

Thomas Dye in his review of these models observes that
the elite-mass model is one which is based on the supposition

that public policy (in this study disability benefits) must
be seen as the "preferences and values of a governing elite.

The elite^ which is drawn from the upper socio-economic strata,

may indeed work through the political system and may be "public

regarding."

But the basic point is that policy created to

deal with non- elite

‘''Thomas

(or mass)

problems is formulated and

Dye, Understanding Public Policy

,

p.

20.

^^James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "PublicRegardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," America n
Political Science Review 58 (December, 1964), 876-887.

7

implemented by the elite and not by the non-elite.
One of the attractive features of this model is its

parsimony, i.e., the interrelationships of all of the members
of the polity are placed under the basic concepts of "elite”

and "mass"

(or "non- el ite")

.

Paradoxically, however, it

is

this economy of interpretive concepts which tends to vitiate
the usefulness of this model, since it does not account for

the whole range of variables in political reality which might
be hypothesized as factors affecting the types of political

process and specifically public policy in existence in

a

particular polity.
The group model, as the name implies, is based on the

contention that the primary concern of analysis should be
the struggle of groups to influence public policy determination.

Government acts as

a

referee or manager of conflict

among competing groups by setting up certain "rules of the
game," recording compromises between groups in the form of

public policy and enforcing the compromises by its authoritative position.

Thus public policy is a record of the

"equilibrium" achieved in the contest between groups at any

particular time.
As with the elite-mass model,

of this approach is appealing.

same deficiencies

(at

the single-mindedness

However,^ it suffers from the

least as far as this study

as the elite-mass model.

is

concerned)

The effort to subsume all of politica

Thomas Dye, U nderstanding

,

p.

23

.

8

reality under the concept "group” and particularly
"interest
group" produces dubious results since the membership
of

interest groups in the United States is

rather small portion

a

of the total citizenry.

The institutional model rests on the common sense

notion that public policy emanates from governmental institutions, i.e., it is "authoritatively determined, implemented,
and enforced by governmental institutions."^^
states,

As Thomas Dye

institutions may be so structured as to facilitate

certain policy outcomes and to obstruct other policy outcomes."

Certain interests may receive more favorable

attention than others because of the structure of an institution.

Although the institutional model complements the two

previous models, once again the lack of comprehensiveness in
the approach makes it difficult for the researcher to cover

adequately the complex of potential explanatory variables.
Tlie

other models for explaining policy bear

relationship to the institutional framework.

a

close

The "rational-

ist" model may be described most accurately as an "ideal" or

"pure" type construction which proposes

a

"rational" decisions and public policies.
is

way to arrive at
A rational policy

one v;hich is designed to maxim.ize "net value achievement,"

which is attained when all the "relevant values" of

a

society

are known and sacrifices and deprivations of one value are

compensated for by the achieA^ement of greater maximization of
15

Ibid

.

,

p

.

32

16
.

Ibid

.

,

p

.

33

.

9

another value.

The assumptions on which the pure model is

based are of course several, ranging from the ability to

perceive

tl'e

values of all persons throughout the society,

the ab ility to predict the consequences of particular policy

implementations beforehand, and even the allowance by the

citizenry of the "rational decision-making" procedures to be
followed

.

^ ^

Arguing against these assumptions, the incrementalist
theorists have contended that there are no commonly held
societal goals for each particular policy area, and that

specific individuals and groups hold differing views and
values Avhich engender the conflict which is the basis of
The incrementalists argue that policy is primarily

politics.
a

continuation of previous policy decisions.

Policy makers

accept the "legitimacy" of existing programs and focus their

attention upon the "incremental" increases or modifications
Constraints on human intelligence, on

of the base program.

available time, and on available resources and finances all
tend to preclude the decision-maker from expanding the

necessary resources to arrive at

a

"rational" decision on

every policy pioposal.
Both the rationalist and incrementalist models bear
a

close relationship to the institutionalist approach, focus-

ing as they do on the decision-maker himself as an integral

unit within the institutional structure of the political
17

Ibid., pp

.

27

-

30

8

.

10

system.

Since both of these models may be subsumed under

the institutional schema, the same criticisms apply to them

that were pointed to regarding the institutional model.

What is needed is not

a

model which has

a

narrow focus but

one which can encompass within its conceptual framework all
of the relationships and structures emphasized by the other

models
then the limited nature of each of these models

It is

which, as indicated at the outset of the discussion, leads
one,

for the purposes of this study,

systems model.

to the adoption of the

The systems framework, as elaborated by David

Easton, assumes that the political system, consisting of the

decision-makers and the institutional framework within which
they operate, determine public policy according to the in-

fluences on the political system.

1

Easton conceptualizes

the political system as a set of interactions among the

members of

a

society concerned with the "authoritative alloca-

tion of values" for the society at large.

Thus, the author-

itative allocation of values is, for Easton, the function

which distinguishes the political system from the other
systems of society (e.g., social system, economic system)
that constitute

Since

a

tiie

environment of the political system.

political system operates within

a

social and

economic environment and develops w'ithin an historical time
dimension, it is appropriate in this study of state decision-

(Nev.’

^^David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life
York: Wiley, 196 5).
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making in the Disability Insurance program to assess the
impact of these environmental influences upon the establishment and mode of implementation of the program.

environmental factors include;

(1)

These

the political context of

federalism in which the states, functioning as semi- autonomous
polities, have an active role to play in the formulation and

implementation of policies established by the federal government;

(2)

the historical development of the federal system

during which precedents were sufficiently established to
assure the states

a

major role in the implementation of most

federal programs; and

(3)

the social economic characteristics

of the populations within each of the states.

These factors

then constitute the environment for the political system as
it operates

1-3 on pages

in regard to this particular program.
2

and

3

Hypotheses

of this chapter indicate the expected

relationships between these factors of the environment and the
actions of the state political systems in responding through
the implementation of the Disability Insurance program.

The systems model indicates further that inputs in
the form of demands and supports emerge from the environment

and exert pressures upon the political system to which the

latter must respond.

Since the "values" to be allocated by

the political system are normally scarce, decisions as to

their authoritative allocation have to be made which will
not satisfy all groups within the society to the same extent.

The "demands" on the political system from the environment

12

thus represent the claims of the members of the society upon

the system.

Hypotheses 4-6 listed on pages

3

and

4

of this

chapter indicate the nature of the input demands into the

political system that are expected to be associated with

particular responses from the system.
Finally, systems analysis is concerned with those

elements of the political system itself which could have

a,

potential effect on the types of responses made by the decisionmakers.

Here the purpose is to ascertain those features of

the political system which might structure the types of

decisions made by state personnel determining whether or not
to award allowances to disability claimants.

Systems analysis

provides an opportunity for ascertaining the flexibility of
the political system in responding to the influences from the

environment and the pressures on decision-makers
various inputs.

Hypothesis

7,

from, the

together with its several

subsidiary hypotheses, listed on pages

4

and

5

of this chapter,

provides some tent at ive guidelines for thinking about the

relationships of political system characteristics and the
resultant types of policy implementation.
The further elaboration of the particular aspects of
the environment,

inputs, and political system itself and their

relationships to the implementation of the Disability Insurance

program will be presented in the following chapters.
II

will consist of

a

Chapter

discussion of the importance of political

culture and federalism as environmental influences upon the

13

operations of the state political systems.

It will be

argued that since the states do in fact participate in

a

federal system, their influence upcn policy decisions is

almost inevitable, even in those cases where programs are

completely funded by the federal government.

Chapter III

discusses the history of the Social Security program in
general and the Disability Insurance program in particular
in order to demonstrate the importance of the states in

determining the manner in which the policies were to be
implemented.

In the specific case of the Disability Insur-

ance program, it will be shown that the states, because of

their prominent positions within the federal system, were

allowed to play

a

role in the administrative decision-making

process of the program.

In Chapter IV there will be an

analysis of the social economic variables and their impact
upon the types of decisions made by the state disability

determining agencies responsible for the implementat i.on of
the program.

Specifically, the purpose of this chapter will

be to determine which of the socio-economic variables dis-

cussed are most important in explaining the ratio of allowance
to denial rates among the states.

Chapter V will deal with

the input variables and will indicate any relationships

existent between them and the variability in the percentages
of disability benefits awarded to claimants among the states.
In Chapter Vi

the analysis will focus on the political system

variables and will include

a

discussion of the actuaJ.

adm.in

istrative operations of the Disability Insurance program in

14

the states.

Of particular importance here will be the effect

of the institutional framework within which administrators

have to make decisions concerning the awarding of disabilit>

benefits to claimants.

Chapter VII will conclude this study

with an evaluation of the analysis in terms of the hypotheses

indicated at the beginning of this chapter.

Here the major

concern will be to discuss the validity of the primary

hypothesis of this study, i.e., that the states do in fact
play

a

role in the administration of a federally funded

program simply because of their central position within the
federal system of the United States.

CHAPTER

I

I

AMERICAN FEDERALISM:
THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN THE AMERICAN POLITY
The Foundations of Federalis m
in American Political Culture

Although this study

is

in great part a case study of

the role of the states in the implementation of a specific

program, it is intended that the research be firmly rooted
in the overall subject of federalism in the United States.

For this reason this chapter will focus on the general topic
of federalism itself and the attempts of scholars to eluci-

date its principal features.

The purported importance of

federalism leads one to inquire why the essential elements of
federalism, i.e., division of governmental powers between
federal and state governments and the consequent viability of
the states as semi- autonomous political systems, continue to

be maintained nearly two hundred years after the inst itut?>.on

of federalism in the United States.
It

is

aigued here that the resiliency of federalism

in the United States may be attributed to the type of

political culture which is predomiiiant in America.

Altnough

the discussion of federalism and of the history of the Social

Security and Disability Insurance programs will point to the
importance of political culture in shaping both the govern15

^

,

16

mental tradition and the manner of implementing
particular

governmental programs, some discussion of the essential
features cf American political culture might be useful
here.

Most scholars seem to agree that American political
culture can be defined as essentially the "liberal tradition."
This "liberal tradition" consists basically of

set of

a

beliefs and values, shaped by historical experience and the

environmental conditions in which they developed, which
emphasize the importance of the individual as the primary
unit of political society and his well-being as the objective
of social and political existence.

This emphasis on the

individual in the American tradition has resulted in

a

ten-

sion between the notion of Individualism and the concept of

limited government on the one hand, and the idea of popular

sovereignty and

a

more collectivist view of the polity on

the other.

Tracing its historical roots, William Bluhm indicates
that "individualism appeared first as the individualism of

men of property, in good Lockean fashion; this was an indivi-

dualism which implied in the political realm the denial of all
absolute power, no matter where vested- -which implied, in
^On the importance of American political culture in
terms of the shaping of the American polity, see the following
William T. Bluhm, Ideologies and Attitudes: Modern Political
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974);
Cul t ure (Englewood Cliffs,
of th e United States
Culture
Political
Donalcf^J. Devine, The
47-65; Louis
Co.,
1972); esp. p p
(Boston: Little, Brown, and
Harcourt
York:
(New
America
Hartz, The Libera l Tra dition in
Brace, and World, 19 5 5T~!
.

t

.
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short, constitutional government."^

This belief found

concrete expression in the American Constitution of
1789,

mechanisms for balancing powers and providing for
mutual checks among the branches of government.

James

Madison indicated the concern of the Founding Fathers with
the problem of limited government when he wrote in The

Federal i s

In framing a government which is to be adminis-

.

tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed
and in the next place oblige it to control itself."^
The notion of popular sovereignty in the American

tradition was emphasized by Thomas Jefferson.
to Madison,
is
a

In contrast

Jefferson argued that "the law of the majority

the natural law of every society of men."^

"republic" as

He defined

"government by its citizens in mass,

a

controlling directly and personally, according to the rules

established by the majority."^

Furthermore, Jefferson was

less interested in preserving the same Constitution for an

indefinite period of time, and insisted that each new

generation would have to remake the fundamental institutions
of government to suit the will of the majority at that time.

-

'

B 1 uhm
i

0

^

.

.

I

,

p

de ologies and A ttitudes
.

^Ibid., p.

7

1

72.

,

p

.

71.
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As Jefferson wrote:

We may consider each generation as a distinct
nation
with a right, by the will of the majority, to bind
themselves, but not to bind the succeeding genera-

tions. ...
The idea that institutions established for the use of
the nation cannot be touched nor modified
may
perhaps be a salutary provision against the abuses of
a monarch, but is most absurd against the nation
itself.^
.

.

.

This emphasis on popular sovereignty and majority will

more positive orientation to the role of govern-

ni3^riifests

a

ment in

society or at least to the ability and right of

a

the people through majority expression to designate the type

of government which is most desirable at the time.

Throughout the history of the American republic, the

principles of limited government (individualism) and popular

sovereignty (collectivism) have remained central elements in

American political culture.

Alternating between periods of

relative harmony and more pronounced conflict, they have

nevertheless run in "counterpoint"

7

to one another,

albeit

with varying degrees of harmony and disharmony.
Since the late nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries, the individualist element in the American politica

culture has been on the decline from its position of relative

predominance in the early and middle nineteenth century.
Movements such as Populism in the 1890s and Progressivism in
the early 1900s sought to emphasize the collective-popular

sovereignty element and were in varying degrees opposed to
^^Ibid_.

,

p.

72.

^Ibid.

,

p.

73.
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the individualistic principle.

V

Although the latter achieved

revival during the 1920s, after the inception of the

a

Depression and the beginning of the New Deal, the positive
role of government in the establishment of justice and promo-

tion of general welfare and economic security became the

predominant theme in American political culture.
It

is

important to remember, however, that the two

principles of limited government and popular sovereignty
continue to exist in

a

dynamic counterpoint.

As will be

pointed out in the chapter on the history of the Social
Security programs, the notion of limited government influenced

decision-makers in the way various social service programs
were formulated and designed for administration.
lar,

In particu-

the states were given substantially more responsibility

in these programs than one might suspect if one considered

only the influence of the popular sovereignty element in

American political culture.
In the larger context than the formulation of any one

program or group of programs, the two basic elements of

American political culture have been important in preserving
a

federal system in the United States.

Both the tendency to

extreme decentralization and extreme centralization have been

avoided as
principles.
8

a

result of the counterpoint between antagonistic
That both types of influences are necessary for

Ibid., pp.

76-77.
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the proper functioning of a federal system can
best be seen

by analyzing the concept of federalism itself and
summarizing
the major findings of American political scientists
on the

nature of federalism in the United States.
The Influence of the States
in American Federalism

The idea of a federal polity has been one of the

"basic symbols of the American political tradition."^

Both

political actors and students of politics have used this
symbol over the years to characterize the kind of political

structure and network of relationships among the institutions
of that structure which constitutes the American political

system.

To foreign observers also,

the American system has

become the archetype of the modern federal polity.
Since the idea of federalism has been so central
to an understanding of the American way of government,

there

has been no dearth of attempts among scholars to identify the

essential characteristics of this phenomenon.

Perhaps one

of the more suggestive offerings is one which is presented
by Daniel Elazar.

He has written that federalism is

a

kind of political order animated by political principles
that emphasize the primacy of bargaining and negotiated
coordination among several power centers as a prelude
to the exercise of power within a single political system,
Q

Willmoore Kendall and George Carey, The Basic
Syn^ols o f th e American Political Tradition (Baton Rouge:
Loiiisiana State University Press, 1970).

.
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and stress the value of dispersed power centers
as a
means for safeguarding individual and local
liberties
As Elazar's definition suggests, the notion of

a

political order animated by political principles" implies
a

set of distinct characteristics which must be manifested

in a particular political system before the label
"federal"

may be legitimately applied.

The most important of these

principles is that of "non-centralization."^^

characteristic of any federal polity

An essential

the presence of

is

viable subnational political systems within the national

polity itself, even though the national system retains the
authority to govern in prescribed matters for the whole

political society.

It

is

this element of "noncentralization"

or "the structured dispersion of power among many centers

whose legitimate authority

constitutionally guaranteed"^“

is

that serves primarily to distinguish

a

federal system from

both the "confederal" and "unitary" types, in which either
the constituent political systems or the national system

exercises all of the legitimate authority.

Within this context, then, it

is

important to dis-

tinguish between the notions of "non- central i zation" and

"decentralization" as defining characteristics of political
''^'Daniel Elazar, "Federalism," In ternatio n al Encycl opedia of tn e Soc ial .Sciences
5, p. 5 547
,

^

Stat es,

D an i e 1 Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the
197 2)
p. 3.
2nd cd. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co
^

.

,

,

^"Daniel Elazar, "Federalism and Intergovernmental
Cooperation and Conflict
cds
Relations," in Elazar, ct al
(Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1969).
.

,

.

,

.

.

.
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systems.

Decentralization

is

term that is often erroneously

a

used to describe the relationships between the national and

constituent political systems in

a

federal polity.

The

clearest explication of the difference between these two
concepts is made by Daniel Elazar.

He observes that:

Decentralization implies the existence of a central
authority having a legitimate monopoly of governmental
power which can concentrate, devolve, or reconcentrate functions more or less as it pleases but which
generally chooses the middle course. Non- centralization (the keystone of every true federal system)
on
the other hand, implies the constitutional coexistence
of a general government and governments with more
particularized authority which share governmental
power
,

Thus, within

a

decentralized political system, there

is

a

substantially greater investment of power made in the central
government than one finds within

a

federal political system.

Although, as Elazar points out, the central government may
well decide to devolve

a

number of political functions to

the lower level governments, there is no guarantee that this
In effect,

will be the case.

in a decentralized system of

government, the extent to which the interests of the local

political entities are taken into consideration rests solely
upon the effectiveness of local representatives in the central

government
a non-

However, within

central i zed political system,

both the central, or more precisely ’’general,” government and
13

Ibid

.

,

pp

18

-

19

.
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the constituent governments have a substantial share
of

legitimate authority to govern.

As Elazar discusses

this

type of governmental arrangement: "In the non-centralized

American system, there

is no central

government with

absolute authority over the states in the unitary sense, but
there is a strong national government coupled with strong

state governments that share authority and power, consti-

tutionally and practically."

This same conception of the

non-centralized American federal system of government has
also been very well expressed by Justice Salmon Chase in

a

decision which he wrote for the Supreme Court in the case of
Texas

v.

White in 1869:

The preservation of the States, and the maintenance
of their governments, are as much within the design
and care of the Constitution as the preservation of
the Union and the maintenance of the National government.
The Constitution, in all of its provisions,
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.
Thus, the concept of non-centralization may serve as

a

short-

hand method of characterizing one of the principal features
of
a

It

a

federal polity--"the value of dispersed power centers as

means for safeguarding individual and local liberties."
is

17

within this overall context of non- central! zat ion in

the formal institutional structure of the federal system

^^Ibid.
^^

,

Texas v

^"^Elazar,

p.
.

3.

Wh ite,

7

Wall.

700

"Federalism," lESS

,

(1869).
p.

354

.
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that Elazar posits the principles of "negotiated
coordination"
or the 'primacy of bargaining."

These principles serve as

the essential defining characteristics of Elazar's notion
of

partnership."

Whereas the notion of non-centralization

refers primarily to the constitutional arrangements between
the levels of government within the federal system, the

concept of "partnership" points beyond the constitutional

framework of governance to the actual political arrangements
and activities which characterize the federal polity as it

engages in political action.

As Elazar comments; "Partnership

implies the distribution of real power among the several

centers that must negotiate cooperative arrangements with
one another in order to achieve common goals.
The features of negotiation and bargaining have

become topics of special concern to political scientists

studying federalism within the United States.

Scholars have

undertaken studies to explore the multifaceted arrangements
which manifest the cooperative nature of the American political
system.

However, it

is

important to realize that, although

scholars have long realized that the American federal system
is

a

model of

a non-

central i zed polity, they have not until

quite recently appreciated the complex nature of the insti-

tutional network through which "negotiated coordination"
takes place.

^^Elazar, "Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations."
^^Elazar, American Federalism, p.

3.

.
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The change in perspective of political scientists

toward the actual workings of the American federal system
has been highlighted by the use of the concepts of "dual

federalism" and "cooperative federalism" to distinguish the
two most important theories of the political functioning

of the federal institutions in the United States.

The con-

troversy over the most adequate conceptualization of the
federal system, i.e., over the question of "dual federalism"

versus "cooperative federalism," has emerged from the different aspects of the functioning federal system which have

been studied by the proponents of the two models.

Scholars

who proposed the dual federalism model emphasized the
cons t i tut ional and legal aspects of the federal structure

rather than focusing on the actual functions performed by
the various levels of the political system or on the various

behaviors exhibited by the political actors.
this situation was

tliat

The result of

political scientists produced

a

number of studies on the "constitutional basis" of the

American "partnership," but unfortunately there remained

a

dearth of material on the actual operations of the federal
system
More recencly, political scientists have tended to
focus on the hitherto neglected aspects of federal-state

relationships.

Studies have been undertaken tc analyze such

areas as political, administrative, fiscal, judicial, and

personnel interactions between the two

lev'^els

of govern-
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ment.

Subsequent to this broadening of the scope of

investigations into the operations of the federal system,
scholars gradually have replaced the idea of dual federalism
by that of cooperative federalism.
In order to understand the differences between the

two approaches and to see how the latter theory has modified
the former,

it will be useful to present a summary analysis

of the most important findings of the proponents of the

dual federalism model.

The central thesis of this theory was

that the federal and state systems, besides being structur-

ally autonomous and independent of one another in terms of
laws, electoral procedures, personnel, and so forth, also

perform different types of services for their respective
communities.

Public policies are formulated and implemented

by each level of the political system to solve particular

problems but there is no continuous interaction between them
to determine the most suitable type of policy or service for

the perceived problems.

Any federal-state interaction per-

ceived by the proponents of this theory rested almost solely
on constitutional questions regarding the relationships between

the federal and state governments that were adjudicated by
the state and federal courts.

During the late nineteenth century, when this particular view was most prevalent, James Bryce, in his classic work
7 n

the essays in the collection edited by Daniel
and also P ublius: Journa l
et al., Am erican federalism
'^^See

h'Jazai’,

of Federalism.

,
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The American Commonwealth
tures of

tliis

,

summarized the essential fea-

conception of American federalism as follows:

The characteristic feature and special interest of
the American Union is that it shows us two governments covering the same ground, yet distinct and
separate in their action.
It is like a great factory wherein two sets of machinery are at work, their
revolving wheels apparently intermixed, their bands
crossing one another, yet each set doing its o\,rn
work without touching or hampering the other. 21
As late as the early 1950s, Professor Leonard White could

write in

a

work on the relationship betAveen the states and

the federal government that, early in the nineteenth century,
"

system of government and administration emerged,

a dual

each level independent in its own sphere and operating without
let or hindrance from, the other,

of which it held full command."

each supported by revenues

2 7

Thus, the predominant opinion of scholars for several

decades was that the American federal system, for the greater
part of its history, consisted of

a

set of autonomous

political institutions performing separate functions in an
independent manner for one political society.

Many of these

scholars, however, who wrote during and subsequent to the

Depression of the 1930s, sensed

a

marked change in the

institutional arrangements of the federal structure during
this time period.

No longer

Av^as

the federal structure

?

1

^

^'Leonard White, The States and the Nation
Rlazar, et al.. Coo peration and Conflict

James Bryce, T he American Commonwealth (3rd rev. ed.
New York: Macmillan and Co., 189 57"^ T, p. 318.
in Daniel

,

excerpted

,

pp.

46-47.

m
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assumed to be one of pure dual federalism.
tists such as Jane Perry Clark, in
a1 is

2 3
,

and George C.

S.

TJie

Political scien-

Rise of

a

New Feder-

Benson, in The New Centralization ,^'^

noted both the increasing tendency of the federal and state

government to cooperate in the administration of policies and
also the tendency of the federal government to take the

initiative in policy formation, even in areas which had

supposedly until that time been the concern of the state
governments.

Although the authors differed somewhat in their

evaluations of these new tendencies, Benson being more

apprehensive about the future role of the states in

a

more

"centralized” system, these two works point to the increasing
concern of political scientists in the late thirties and early
forties to investigate the actual functioning of the American
federal system.
The view that the new orientation of the federal

government might have adverse consequences continued into
the 1950s and is very evident in White's remarks on the

future of the states in his book on The States and the

Nation

White observed that, "if present trends continue

.

^^Jane Perry Clark, The R is e of a New F ede ralism
(New York:
Federal State Cooperation in the United States
Columbia University Press, 1938).
:

George C. S. Benson, Th e New Central i zation: A
ionships in the United
Study of Interg overn mental R
States (T'lew York'. FQnehart and Co., 1941)
.

^

^Leonard White, The States and the Na tion (Baton
Route: Louisiana State University Press, 1953).
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for another quarter century, the states may be
left hollow

shells, operating primarily as the field districts of
federal

departments and dependent upon the federal treasury for their
support." 2 6

He explained the emergence of this new type of

federal relationship in terms of the increasing complexity of

modern industrial America, of the increasing welfare services
provided since the inception of the New Deal, and of the
desire of federal administrative officials to properly oversee the management of their programs by state officials.

Thus, until as recently as the last two decades,

scholars were generally agreed that

a

system of dual federal-

ism had prevailed in the American political system from the

early nineteenth century until about the time of the New Deal.
In characterizing the period from the 1930s to the 1950s,

there seemed to be a consensus that changes had been made
in the general relationships of the federal and state govern-

ments, but there was no firm conclusion on the effects of

these changes on the role of the states in the federal system.

During the last several years, substantial empirical

research has been done on the nature of the federal system
in the United States and many,

if not most,

of the older

conclusions about the historical arrangements of the American

political institutions and the development of federalism
since the New Deal have been called into question.

Scholars

working in this area now view their task as one of investi"^Leonard White in Elazar, Conflict and Cooperation,

p.

45.
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gating as rigorously as possible all of the multifaceted

political, administrative, judicial, and financial arrangements which constitute the operating federal system in
the

United States.
One of the leaders of this new group of investigators

was Professor Morton Grodzins, whose influential essay on
The American System"

relations.

proposed

a

new model of

f ederal

-

state

Grodzins argued that, in regard to the imple-

mentation of policy or performance of services, "functions
are not neatly parceled out among the many governments.
are shared functions.

It

is

They

difficult to find any govern-

mental activity which does not involve all three of the so-

called ’levels’ of the federal system."

In a direct

challenge to the former conception of the history of American
federalism, Grodzins wrote that "the American federal system
has never been a system of separated governmental activities.

There has never been

a

time when it was possible to put neat

labels on discrete ’federal,’

’state,’

and

’local’

7q

functions.""

The research to substantiate these claims has been

carried out during the past several years by several political
scientists.

One scholar who has done much to develop and

elaborate upon the work of Grodzins is Daniel Elazar.
has centered his studies upon the general

Elazar

concept of coopera-

Morton Grodzins, "The Federal System," in Charles
Democracy in the Fift y
Press and Oliver P. Williams, ed.
States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).
“

,

28

Ibid., p

.

38

29

Ibid., pp.

40-41.

^
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tion or collaboration, which ho finds to be

a

ubiquitous

feature of the functioning federal system in the United
States.

As he conceptualizes it:

Cooperative, or collaborative federalism can be
defined as the sharing of responsibilities for given
functions by the federal and state governments.
In
this sense, it is conceived to be the opposite of
dual federalism, which implies a division of functions between governments as well as a division of
governmental structures. Although the theory of
cooperative federalism assumes a division of structures, it accepts a system of sharing that ranges from
formal federal - state agreements covering specific
programs to informal contracts on a regular basis
for the sake of sharing information and experience."^
It is clear from this definition that the proponents

of the cooperative federalism model do retain
of the older dual federalism theory.

a

major aspect

There is a basic agree-

ment that the states exist as relatively autonomous political
systems within an overall national polity.

Thus,

in both

accounts, the central feature of any federal system, non-

centralization,

is

given primary attention.

The fundamental criticism of the dual federal model

by those who perceive the American system to be

a

set of

cooperative ariangements focuses on the degree to which the
states and national government are able to practice an autonomous politics, relatively free of influence from other levels
of the political system.

On the one hand, scholars who

proposed the dual federalism model argued that both national
“’^Daniel Elazar, The American Partnership: Inter
United
governmental Cooperation i n the Nineteenth Century
^
S t a t e s (Chicago": University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 305.
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and state political systems indeed did carry out
political

functions relatively independent of one another.

However,

proponents of the cooperative federalism model argue that in

virtually no area of political action are the federal and
state political systems autonomous in their formulation
and implementation of public policy.

Such
a

a

model as cooperative federalism presupposes

whole array of institutionalized relationships between the

federal and state polities within which the sharing or cooperative process takes place.

In its most generalized form,

the

typical cooperative relationship manifests itself, according
to Elazar,

as

follows:

The federal government, the states, and the localities
share the burden for the great domestic programs by
making the larger governments primarily responsible
for raising revenues and setting standards, and the
smaller ones primarily responsible for administering
the programs.
For each program, all governments
involved contribute toward making policy in ways that
often depend upon the forms of sharing involved.
The forms of sharing have changed and multiplied

during the development of the American polity.

A comprehen-

sive examination of the multifaceted aspects of the sharing

process in the American system is beyond the scope of this
paper.

Attention will be focused primarily upon some of the

basic formal and informal arrangements which the federal and
state governments have devised during the past few decades.
The multiplication of governmental functions and

^^Daniel Elazar, American Federalism, pp

.

47-48.

,

.
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various forms of cooperation may be viewed as the prolonged
effort of the political systems of both the federal and
state levels to respond to the social and economic problems

inherent in an industrialized society.

On the most general

level, this expanding role of the governmental sector mani-

fests itself as an increase in the "velocity of government
or "the amount of governmental activity in relation to the

total activity of society."
It

is

•z 7.

important to realize, however, that

a

history

of institutionalized cooperative federal relationships

helped to shape the structure of the particular responses
made by the political system to the various social and

economic problems which it confronted.

In the late nine-

teenth century and even more during the first three decades
of the twentieth century,

it became

increasingly clear that

the state political systems alone could not respond with

sufficient resources to provide adequate services for the
poor, aged, unemployed, and disabled, whose numbers increased

under the impact of the rapid growing economic system.

With-

in the context of an operating dual federal system, the

pressures toward complete federal control over domestic
service programs would have been far more intense than was

possible within the confines of

Ibid

.

,

pre-existing cooperative

Thus, as Elazar points out, the twentieth

federal structure.
32

a

.

50.
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,

p
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century has witnessed federal intervention in various

policy areas as

a

means for stimulating and supplementing

rather than preempting state action as would have been the
case under

a

dual federal system.

One of the most prominent examples of the stimulating

rather than preempting character of federal action has been
the development of the grants - in- aid programs.

Grant s - in- aid

consist of federal transfers of funds to state governments
and federal and state transfers of funds to local governments
for specific purposes which are agreed upon by the govern-

ments participating in the program.

subject to
government.

a

Grants are normally

measure of supervision and review by the granting
The grant-in-aid programs developed greatly in

this century, when,

from 1911 to 1965, sixty-five new federal

programs of this sort were established.

35

Although at times

these types of programs have been considered to be solely

formulated and supervised by the federal government, it

is

more correct to state that grant-in-aid programs have been

essentially federal in nature, i.e., involving both the
federal and state governments in cooperative efforts.

Federal

regulations have been designed essentially to stimulate the
state governments toward more professional administrative

organization and to increase the likelihood that state administrators might participate as partners with their professional
^^Ibid.

,

p.

51.

'Daniel Elazar,
p.

12.

et al.,

^operation and Conflict

,

.
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counterparts within the federal agencies.
In the typical grant-in-aid program,

in fact,

each

state is left the responsibility for planning the program,

preparing the necessary budgets, enacting appropriate legislation, and providing funds for the implementation of the

specific program.

Although federal requirements do exist,

in the form of Congressional enactment and the administrative

regulations stipulated by the federal agencies, the state

political systems have

a

number of opportunities to influence

the actual policy making process in this type of program.

Because of the number of grant-in-aid programs that
have been established in the United States, political

scientists have tended to concentrate their study of the

cooperative elements of the American federal system in this

particular area.

However, those programs which do not neatly

fall into this particular type of grant-in-aid category also

merit considerably more study than has been undertaken until
now
One example of such a neglected policy area is that
of the federal Disability Insurance program, enacted in 1956.

Unlike the federal grant-in-aid categories, the Disability
Insurance program is

a

policy area in which the federal

^Daniel Elazar, American Federalism pp. 160-171;
also cf. Jerome T. Murphy, "The Education Bureaucracies
Implement Novel Policy: The Politics of Title I of ESEA,
1965-1972," in Allan P. Sindler, Policy and Politics in
America: Six Case Studies (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.,
1973)
,

.
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government appropriates all of the funds and stipulates all
of the regulations for the implementation of the program.

However, vvithin this framework, the states are authorized to

administer the program themselves

Thus, as with grant-

.

programs, both the federal and state governments
have

a

role to play in the implementation of the policy.

such

a

case,

In

there exists a potential for cooperative

relations between the federal and state administrative

agencies in regard to the formulation of decision-making

criteria and in regard to the actual execution of the policy

within the individual states.

One would not expect the states,

in this type of program,

to exercise the freedom of decision-

making possible within

grant-in-aid program.

a

However, the

extent to which cooperative relations do exist between the
federal and state governments within the Disability Insurance

program and the exact nature of that cooperation should be
investigated in order to determine how the institutional
structure of
a

a

federal polity might affect the way in which

particular policy is formulated and implemented.

might ask, for example, how much of

a

role did

tlie

One

states,

by the virtue of their key place within the federal system,

play in the original formulation of the Disability Insurance

program?

What kinds of influence do the states have presently

^^See Chapter III for the details on the relationship between the federal and state governments in the Disability Insurance program.
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over the actual decision-making processes in this policyarea?
To set the framev:ork for the analysis of the operation
of the federal Disability Insurance program, the next chapter

will concentrate on the historical development of the various

programs under the Social Security Act and the relationship
of the disability program to these grant-in-aid programs.

This analysis will afford an opportunity to study more closely
the actual process of formulation and implementation of

policies within

a

cooperative federal system.

.

CHAPTER

I

I

I

DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND
DISABILITY

INSUR.i\NCE

PROGRAMS

Introductio n
The depression of the 1930s had

major impact upon

a

the development of American federalism.

The events of this

period illustrate well the tendencies for cooperation and

partnership among the levels of government even in
of serious political and economic stress.

a

period

Furthermore, they

exemplify the role of American political culture, in particular the counterpoint of individualism and popular sovereignty,

which affects the orientations of decisions makers and acts
to preserve the system of cooperative relations between the

states and the federal government and to keep them in

balance
The duration and intensity of the economic turmoil
of that period was unprecedented in the nation's history.

Unemployment had begun to rise as early as 1928 and 1929.
By April 1930 the number of persons out of work had increased
to 3.8 million members of the civilian labor force.

This

steady rise in the number of people unemployed reached its
peak in 1933

,

when

than 15 million people, or 28 percent

m.ore

of the civilian labor force, had no jobs.^
^Ilelen Clarke, Socia l Legislation
Appieton-Ccnturv-Crof ts 1957), p. 524.
38
,

During this same
(2nd ed.; New York:
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time period, from 1929 to 1933, the gross national
product

dropped from 181.8 billion dollars to 126.6 billion.

Only

in 1939 did the GNP again reach its previous
1929 level,

although the population of the country had grown by nine

million during that period.^
As the depression worsened and its economic effects

continued to produce financial insecurity for millions of
people, growing numbers of public officials realized that the

existing public programs providing relief for the indigent
were decidedly inadequate.

Up to this period the responsi-

bility for assisting those persons with severe problems of
economic insecurity rested largely with the states and their
local subdivisions, and with private organizations.

Many explanations have been offered to account for
the slow development of public welfare institutions in this

country.

Throughout the greater portion of the nineteenth

century, agriculture, except in the South, was carried on

basically by independent farmers on their own land.

Economic

dependence on the fluctuations of the business cycle was
thereby kept to

a

minimum.

In those areas where industriali-

zation was rapidly developing, economic growth was usually

sufficient to absorb the growing population.
7

'

When periodic

...

"Gaston Rimlinger, Welfa re Policy and Industrialization
in Europe, America, and Russi a (New York: Wiley, 1971), p. 196.
^Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating
the Poor: The Fun ctions of Public Welfare (Nev; York: Vintage
Books
1971), p. 45.
,

^
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economic distress did occur, it was not ordinarily serious
enough to lead to major political disorder.^

Furthermore,

until the late nineteenth century, the frontier served to

drain off

a

substantial number of those who were discontented

in the urban areas.

These factors helped to bolster the belief, prevalent
in the United States throughout the nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, in economic individualism, which

placed great emphasis on the individual as the sole protector of his own economic security.

One writer has remarked,

in a comparative study of the development of economic security

legislation in

a

number of countries, that "in the United

States the commitment to individualism, to individual achieve-

ment and self-help, was much stronger than in England or in
The survival of the liberal tradition, therefore,

France.

was found to be stronger and the resistance to social pro-

Poverty therefore came to be

tection more tenacious."^

regarded in the United States as "the obvious consequence of
sloth and sinfulness.

.

.

.

The promise of America was not

affluence, but independence; not ease, but
for oneself,

^

Ibid

.

,

p.

7

46.

^

Ibid

^Rimlinger, p. 62.
”piven and Cloward, p.

46.

chance to work

and to win esteem through

to be self-supporting,

hard and honest labor."

a

.

,

p

.'

46.

.
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Throughout the nineteenth century, private charity

organizations handled the majority of the cases of destitution and old-age.

Public institutions such as almshouses and

poor farms provided relief for those not helped by the

private agencies.

8

These public agencies were financed and

operated by local communities with virtually no assistance
from the state or federal governments.^

Public Assistance Before 1955
To supplement the public aid provided by the alms-

houses on the local level,

a

number of state governments

adopted programs which would provide cash payments to the
One of the major categories of the cash payment

indigent.

Public assistance programs

program was public assistance.

were designed to provide monetary payments on

a

monthly or

semi-monthly basis to those persons who could meet the
requirements of financial need stipulated in the specific
The two major public assistance programs

state programs.

adopted by the states before the depression were Aid to the
Blind (AB) and Old Age Assistance (OAA)

.

In regard to AB

public assistance, Illinois enacted the first program in
1903,

and by 1934, 24 states had adopted similar programs.
O

Rimlinger, p. 63.
^

^

Ibid
Hi

1 a

p

.

ry M

.

.

,

Public Assistance

63

Problems and Policy in
Harper,
1955), p. 54.
York:
(New
L eyend ecke

,

.

3

.
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After Montana established the first OAA program in
1923,
several states enacted similar legislation.

By 1934

(one

year prior to the adoption of the Social Security Act)
were 28 states

vv'ith

,

there

OAA programs.

These public assistance programs stipulated several

requirements that potential recipients had to meet in order
to receive assistance.

Provisions for length of residence

of an applicant, his level of income, and condition of non-

support by relatives or private agencies varied from one

program to another

,

but generally tended to exclude

large

a

number of people because of the stringency of the require.
ments

12

Local administrative agencies in the counties and

cities implemented the public assistance programs and were

given great latitude by the state governments in actual

policy-making decisions.

1

However, to

a

great extent the

effectiveness of an assistance program such as OAA or AB

depended on the existence of financial participation by the
In many instances

states.

the local communities did not have

sufficient resources to enable them to provide public assistance without substantial financial support from the state
.
go ve rnments

^^

14

Ibid

.

,

p.

54.

^Robert J. Myers, Social Insurance and Allied Govern ment Pro grams (Homewood, 111.: R.D. Irwin, 1965), pp 11-13.
^

.

'•^Ibid.

,

pp.

11-13.

^^Leyendecker

,

p.

55.
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The states which had adopted the OAA and AB assis-

tance programs were not equally committed to providing

sufficient funds to the local governments to enable the
latter to assist effectively those persons who would other-

wise meet the requirements for receiving OAA or AB assistance.

only seventeen of the twenty-four states

In 1934,

with AB assistance legislation had any form of state aid to

supplement the expenditures of the local governments.

Of

the twenty-eight states with OAA programs, only sixteen were

financed in part with state aid, although six of these states
had programs totally financed by the state governments.^^
Thus, many of the pre-depression state public assistance

programs were more symbolic in nature than substantive.
Social Insurance Before 1935

Before the enactment of the Social Security Act of
1935, social insurance programs were established largely by

private organizations in order to provide financial aid to
workers who had become unemployed.

One of the major types

of social insurance programs instituted during this period
was unemployment compensation insurance.

established on

a

private agencies.

This programt was

voluntary basis and was administered by
A Bureau of Labor Statistics study

published in 1931 concluded that there were basically three
types of unemployment compensation plans in existence, all
^^Tbid.

,

pp.

11-13.
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the result of private arrangements.

These included plans

established by employers, plans established as

a

result of

the cooperation of employers and unions, and plans established

solely by trade union organizations.^^

It was not until

1932

that Wisconsin enacted the first compulsory unemployment

compensation insurance law.
Unlike the public assistance programs, which used
financial need as the basic criterion for distributing assistance, the social insurance programs were designed to provide

benefits as

a

matter of right to any person who participated

in the program and who had become unemployed.

assistance programs relied upon

a

Whereas public

yearly appropriation of

funds by the state legislatures, the social insurance programs

were financed by the contribution of employers and/or employees to special trust funds from which employees could receive

benefits if they became unemployed.
Social Security Act of 1955: Public Assistance

During the early 1930s public officials gradually

began to realize that the state and local public assistance

programs and provisions for social insurance established by
private organizations were not adequate to deal with the
problems of economic insecurity caused by the depression.
The Social Security Act of 1955 was enacted in order to

^^John D. Hogan and Francis A. J. lanni, America n
Social Legislation (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 493.

.

,

.
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improve and to supplement the existing public and private

programs.

Public assistance and social insurance programs

constituted the principal categories of this new legislation
and thus may be viewed as an extension of the previous

programs
The major programs of public assistance established
by the Social Security Act included Old-Age Assistance (OAA)

Aid to the Blind (AB)

,

and Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)

Other minor aspects of the public assistance category consisted of
services.

a

17

number of public health and child welfare
The principal goal of these programs was

essentially the same as that of the previous state assistance programs, namely the provision of cash payments to

indigent individuals on the basis of their financial needs
as determined by the public agency implementing the program.

the federal governirient

In order to achieve this goal,

sought to stimulate state activity in
areas

a

number of policy

(e.g., OAA, AB, ADC) by providing sufficient, financial

support to enable the states to create and implement sound

programs of public assistance.

To this end,

federal legis-

lation provided that certain minimum standards be observed
in the administration of the programs.

First, a state program had to include a provision
for the establishment of a state administrative agency

^"^Artliur J.

Security

(i'^ladison:

Altmeyer, The Formative Yea rs of Sociaj_
University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 15
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cither to implement the program itself or to oversee its

administration by county or municipal jurisdictions.
a

Second,

state program had to be in effect in all of the legal

jurisdictions within the state, i.e., within all of the
counties, cities or towns in the state.

Third, a state

program had to provide for the financial participation of
the state in the public assistance program, whether the

program was actually implemented by the state agency itself
or by the county or municipal jurisdictions.

Other federal provisions imposed

a

number of pro-

cedural requirements on the state administrative agencies.
One such provision consisted of requiring a fair hearing and

appeal before

a

state agency for any individual whose applica-

tion for financial assistance had been denied.
The federal government placed very few stipulations
on the states'

freedom to determine residence and citizenship

requirements.

Federal regulations specified only that states

might impose

a

residence requirement restricting assistance

to those persons who had lived in a particular state for

five out of the previous nine years and one year continuously

preceding application for assistance.
Although these federal standards imposed standards
on the mode of implementation of these public assistance

programs, the states retained

a

great amount of flexibility

in designing the program to fit the particular requirements

of their individual communities.

In the important area of

^
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definition and determination of recipient need,
the federal
statute specified only that awards had to be based
on the

presence cf financial need.

No attempt was made to specify

in fedeial legislation the actual conditions
to be met in

determining financial need in

a

potential recipient.

The states also retained the right to determine the

amount of payments to public assistance applicants.
federal government reimbursed the states for
the costs of the programs.

a

The

portion of

For example, in the OAA and AB

assistance programs, the federal authorities agreed to pay,
in the 1935 provisions of the Social Security Act,

fifty

percent of the amount of state assistance to applicants
per month, up to

a

maximum of $30.

In regard to the ADC

program, the federal government would pay (again in the 1935

provisions) $6 of the first $18 spent by the states per

month on the first child of

a

family, and $4 of the first $12

spent on each additional child in the same family.

Although federal reimbursement was limited to

a

specific percentage of the state assistance spent on each
recipient, federal aid was "open-ended" since there was no

overall limit to the amount of aid that
Tiius

,

a

state might receive

states that awarded small amounts of money to large

numbers of applicants could potentially receive large amounts
^^Rimlinger, p.

224.

^

Congress and the Nation (1945- 1 964) A Review of
Govern men t and Politic s in the Postwar Year s (Washington, D.C
Congress i onal Quarterly Service, 1964), p. 12S0.
:
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of funds from the federal government.

No matter how the

states might allocate benefits in fact, they possessed

a

great amount of flexibility in their implementation of these

public assistance programs.

Ultimately, however, each of

these programs was conceived to be only

a

temporary first

line of defense against economic insecurity.

Social Security Act of 1955: Social Insurance
The long-range goal of the federal policy makers was
to replace the public assistance programs with functioning

social insurance programs.

The principal goal of the social

insurance program was to provide cash benefits to persons as
a

matter of right, rather than financial need, and thus to

avoid the "means" test imposed upon applicants for public

assistance awards.
The more innovative of the two major social insurance

programs incorporated into the Social Security Act was Old
Age Insurance.

Unlike the public assistance programs, which

were financed by appropriations from the general revenue,
the Old Age Insurance program relied upon the compulsory

contributions of employers and employees in
tax.

a

special payroll

The statute provided that a payroll tax of one percent

(on the first $5,000 of the employee's earnings)

be levied

on all employers and employees in most major businesses.
In the case of such an insurance program,

worked in

a

a

person who

"covered" employment, one in which employers and
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employees made regular contributions into the payroll
for

a

specific length of time, could receive by right

monthly cash pension upon reaching age 65.

t;
;ax

a

The exact amount

of the pension was subject to federal regulation and
was

based upon the average earnings received by

a

specific worker

prior to his retirement.
The Old Age Insurance program was the only pr ogram

incorporated into the Social Security Act to be administered
solely by federal administrative personnel.

This was done for

the sake of administrative efficiency, since officials assumed

that the tasks of keeping accurate records of all individual

workers, many of whom moved from one state to another during
their working careers, could be accomplished only by use of
one centralized agency.
The other segment of the social insurance category
in the Social Security Act consisted of provisions for an

unemployment compensation insurance program.

In this program,

the federal policy makers sought to induce the states to create

their own individual unemployment insurance programs, rather
than to create
level.

a

nationally administered program at the federal

This task was accomplished by requiring all employers

with four or more employees in their firms to pay

s.

3.1 per-

cent federal payroll tax on the first $3,000 of the annual

wages of each employee.

The statute provided, however

that

if a state established an unemployment compensation program

(approved by federal law)

,

employers in that state would receive
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an offset of 2.7 percent from the
3.1 percent federal tax.
In this case,

the employers would pay a state payroll tax,

receive credit against the federal tax, and pay
the remaining
0.4 percent of the federal tax to the federal
government.

This tax-offset mechanism, in lieu of the more familiar
grant-

in-aid device to stimulate the states to set up or improve
a

particular public program, proved to be rather effective,

and by the end of 1939, all of the states had initiated such

unemployment insurance programs.
The administrative structure of the unemployment

insurance program, was rather similar to that of the typical

public assistance policy.

The state legislatures decided

upon the amount of benefits to be awarded to the various

unemployed workers, the length of time that benefits might be
paid, and the requirements for attaining insured status in a

covered employment.
The similarity between the public assistance and un-

employment insurance programs, however, must not lead one to

confuse the purposes of the two policies.

The unemployment

compensation program was instituted as an insurance program,
to provide cash benefits to unemployed people who participated

in the program.

The qualifications for receiving benefits,

although they varied in their particulars from state to state,
were structured around the concept of covered employment rather
than of need.

51

Post-1955 Developm ents in Public
Assistance: General Trends
The adoption of the public assistance programs by
the states after 1935 proceeded quite rapidly.

By September

1938, all of the 48 states, the District of Columbia, and the

territories of Alaska and Hawaii had adopted OAA programs

approved by the Social Security Board.

In June 1941,
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jurisdictions had established ADC programs, and 43 had

instituted AB assistance programs.
The vast majority of the amendments to the Social

Security Act focused on provisions dealing with financial aid
to the states.

There has been

a

steady increase in the per-

centage of finnncial assistance given to the states by the
federal government.

Although it is not necessary for the

purposes of this thesis to present

a

in the public assistance programs,

it

history of the changes
is

appropriate to

mention one of the more recent important alterations in their
structure and implementation.

In a 1972 Amendment,

three of

the major grant-in-aid assistance programs. Aid to the Blind,

Old Age Assistance, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally

Disabled, were consolidated and transformed into one SuppleThe effect of the

mentary Security Income (SSI) program.

amendment is to "nationalize" (or "federalize") these formerly
^James A. Maxwell, T he Fiscal Impact of Federalism
in the United State s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
155.
Pres s
19 4 6), p
,

.

^^Congress and the Natio n, pp

.

1280-1283.
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federal-state programs and to assure that federal benefits,
under uniform rules, will be paid to all eligible claimants.
These payments, financed by general revenues, and begun in

January 1974, may be supplemented by the states in any assistance programs which they might choose to adopt.

program

is

particularly

relei'^ant

This new

to the present study, because

the Disability Determination Units, which administer the

Dis-

ability Insurance program in each of the states, have the

additional responsibility now of implementing the disability
aspect of the new SSI program, formerly administered by
state agencies under the APTD program.
Post- 1955 S S Developments: Attempts
to Institute a PI Program
.

.

One of the most important developments in the history
of Social Security legislation since 1935 was the establish-

ment of the Disability Insurance program in 1956.

period from 1935 to 1956, there had been

a

During the

great deal of con-

troversy over the proper role of the federal government in

regard to the support of disabled persons and concerning the
form that support, if given, should assume.

Even in the middle of the 1930s, there existed several

federal or state programs for assisting the disabled.

For

public and private employees, there were 'federal and state

workmen's compensation programs

vv'hich

assisted persons injured

while on the job by payirig medical costs and certain living
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expenses to the injured person and his family.

For the

indigent blind person, whose blindness had been incurred in

either work-related or non-work- related activity, the Social

Security Act included
(i.e.

,

a

Aid to the Blind)

special public assistance program
,

which provided regular monthly

cash benefits for living expenses.

Furthermore, the Railroad

Retirement Act of 1937 made provision for the payment of some

disability insurance benefits to disabled railway workers.
The major problem with these programs, however, was

that they provided assistance only to special categories of

individuals or for special types of disabilities.

Workmen's

compensation programs, for example, covered only those
injuries sustained by

a

person while performing his job;

and the AB program assisted only those disabled by blindness.

Likewise, the Railroad Retirement Act covered only employees
in a specialized job category.

Thus, coverage for persons

afflicted with permanent or temporary disabilities was not

provided in any all-inclusive program.
By 1937,

the Social Security Board had already

concluded that additional legislation was needed in order to
cope v;ith the problem.

A.

J.

Altmeyer, representing the Board,

pointed out that, although there existed protection against
unemployment because of occupational injury, there was no

"comprehensive protection against unemployment due to disability
22

Ibid.

,

p.

1287.

23

Ibid.

,

p.

1287.

o

^
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in a

non- occupat ional capacity” in either state or
federal

egislation.

Whereas state workmen's compensation programs

provided assistance to those disabled on the job, they did
not cover persons incurring injuries off the job.

The Social

Security Board proposed that action be taken to institute

a

program to relieve the problem of temporary and permanent
disability, that it come under the jurisdiction of the Old-Age
Insurance program, and that payments be made both to the

disabled and the dependents of disabled persons.
However, responses from Congress were such that no

attempt was made to present the proposals for Congressional

consideration.

There was firm opposition from the Republican

party leaders in Congress to the development of any new program
under the Social Security Act.

As a result, when the Social

Security Board subm.itted its three-year study of the development of the Social Security programs in 1939, it stated that
no "positive recommendations” were being made ”at this time”

on the necessity for a Disability Insurance program.
In 1939.

however. Senator Robert

F.

26

Wagner introduced

to establish a federal - state cooperative disability

a bill

grant-in-aid program, in which
74
“

a

maximum of freedom and re.

First Annual Re port of the Social Security Board
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 12.

^^Susan Campbell, A Changing Federalism: Federal - State
Relations in the Dis ability Ins urance P rogra m, Unpublished Masters
Thesis U. of Mass., 1967, p. 75.
,

^

A Rep r t of the Social Security Board to the President

and to the Congress
"
r9"39T7T“*7:^

(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

.

.
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sponsibility would have been given to the states to implement
the policy.

Had it been enacted into law, this proposal would

have encouraged the states to institute public assistance

programs for the disabled who were in financial need, as

determined by the state agencies themselves.
have operated as

a

Thus,

it

would

typical federal grant-in-aid program.

Opposition to this bill was voiced by
interest groups during public hearings.
the American Medical Association (AMA)

,

a

number of

Representatives of
in particular,

argued

that such a program would eventually lead to a federally

administered, compulsory insurance program.

defeated in committee.

The bill was

No significant progress was made in

the institution of a Disability Insurance program during the

remaining years of the administration of President Roosevelt.
During the administrations of President Truman,

debate continued between the President and members of Congress
who opposed the extension of the Social Security insurance

program to cover disability.

Opponents of

a

Disability

Insurance program voiced their opposition to the possible
harmful effects on the economy of increased public expenditures
and to the increase of federal influence in any expanded pro-

gram

28

Pressure for action, however, continued to increase.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate. Subcommittee on Education
and Labor, Hearings, To Establish a National Health Progiam
76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, p. 79.
28

Campbell

,

p

.

87

,
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Efforts at amending the Social Security Act were
directed
toward the establishment of

a

social insurance type disability

program, to be administered in the same manner as the
Old-Age

Insurance program (i.e., federal administration, payroll tax,
and provision of benefits as a matter of right to all
those

persons qualifying under the program).

made for

a

Other proposals were

public assistance type program to support disabled

persons not eligible for insurance benefits.

This latter

program would have operated in similar fashion to the proposed
Robert Wagner program discussed above.
need as determined by the states,

Based on financial

it would have acted to

support those disabled persons unable to qualify under the

disability insurance provisions.
In 1949 the House of Representatives passed an

omnibus Social Security bill, containing both

a

disability

insurance program tied to the Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance

program and

a

new public assistance program for the disabled.

The House had previously rejected an alternative measure which
had proposed to drop the insurance provisions and to retain

Because of opposition

only the public assistance features.

within the Senate, the disability insurance provisions were
finally dropped, but the public assistance features of the
bill were enacted into

lav\r

and constituted the program of Aid

to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
29
'

Congress and the Nation

,

p

.

(APTD)

1287.

.

In the APTD
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program, the Congress authorized the federal
government to pay
a percentage of the costs of the operation
of a state's
dis-

ability assistance program if the latter agreed to
operate

within the framework of minimum federal requirements.

As

with any grant-in-aid program, the states assumed the principal

responsibility for instituting and maintaining the program
within their respective jurisdictions.
The next major attempt to amend the Social Security

Act in regard to disability policy occurred in 1952.

One of

the proposals in the omnibus Social Security Amendments bill

that year consisted of a provision for

a

to be added to the Old-Age and Survivors'

"disability freeze"
Insurance program.

This measure was designed to assist a worker w'ith

a

long-term

disability by preventing his period of disability from being
counted against him in regard to

(1)

the computation of the

number of quarters that he needed in covered employment to
be eligible for OASI at 65 years of age;

and

the com-

(2)

putation of his average monthly wages on which the amount
of the old-age pension

w^as

based.

Unlike

a

disability

insurance provision, the disability freeze did not provide

benefits to

a

disabled person, but only assured him that the

requirements for OASI (i.e.,

a

minimum number of quarters in

covered employment) could be fulfilled during
long-term disability.
•^°Ibid., p.

a

period of

In opposing this new bill,

1288.

representa-
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lives of the AMA contended that, by giving to the
Federal

Social Security Agency the right to supervise
disability

determinations, the program would lead to eventual federal

regulation of medicine.

The bill was ultimately defeated.

At the beginning of the Eisenhower administration
in 1953,

there was an initial period of doubt about the

attitude of the new President toward Social Security programs
in general and toward the social insurance type of programs

(e.g.

.

Old - Age - Survivor s

in particular.

’

Insurance; Unemployment Insurance)

In 1954, however,

he sent a Special Message to

Congress in which he explained his support for the concept of
social insurance as incorporated into the Social Security Act.
He based his conclusions upon what

lie

perceived to be the

congruence between the idea of social insurance and the traditional American interest in individual initiative.

He argued

that the fundamental difference between the social insurance

program and other private insurance programs was that the
former enabled citizens to build the foundation for their

individual security on

a

national scale.

3

Thus, operating

as it did on the principle of requiring individuals to con-

tribute to their own security, it was

a

"reflection of the

American heritage of sturdy self-reliance."
^'^^

Ibid

.

,

p.

3

"^'

1288

T O

Eisenhower, The Public Papers of the
President of the United State s (Washington: Li.S. Government
Printing Office i960), Vol. 1954, p. 534.
Dw^ight D.
,

^^Ibid.

,

p.

534.

.
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Later in 1954, President Eisenhower requested the
^r^sctment of a

disability freeze."

attempt to adopt

Unlike the previous

disability freeze, this one passed through

a

Congress with considerably less opposition.

Undoubtedly,

the influence of President Eisenhower and his views on the

positive quality of

a

national social security program had

an effect in assuaging opposition from members of Congress,

especially those Republicans who had previously argued against
any extension of the social security programs.
At least as important as this change in attitude

among Congressional members, however, was the introduction
into the disability freeze bill of features far less objection-

able to potential critics than those in the 1952 bill.
in the 1952 bill,

As

the new proposal for a disability freeze

simply sought to provide assurance to long-term disabled

workers that the requirements for receiving Old-Age Insurance
could be fulfilled during their period of disability.
was

no

There

provision for the payment of benefits to disabled

persons
However, whereas the previous bill had contained

a

provision for allowing the Federal Social Security Agency the
right to supervise the disability freeze, the new bill pro-

posed that state vocational rehabilitation agencies administer
tliO

new program.

The House Ways and Means and Senate Finance

Committees explained the emphasis on state administration as
follows;

(1)

the states had 34 years of experience in the

.
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field of vocational rehabilitation;

(2)

state officials

understood better the peculiarities of their "occupational
terrains" (i.e., the opportunities for employment in

particular area), and

(3)

a

the states' proximity to the indi-

vidual enabled them to judge more accurately whether

a

particular person was eligible for the disability freeze.
Thus, emphasis was placed not only on

a

decentralized system

of administration but also upon the importance of vocational

rehabilitation for the disabled.

In this manner potential

opponents of the measure were able to reconcile the idea of
a

disability freeze with their strong support for

a

free

enterprise type of economic system based upon individual
•

^

^
initiative
•

•
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The disability freeze incorporated into the 1954

Social Security Amendments became operative in July 1955.
For the purposes of the program, disability was defined as
the "inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to result in death or to be
of long- continued and indefinite duration."
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In 1955 alone,

57,221 applications for the disability freeze were approved.
^'^Campbel 1
^^

Ibid

.

,

,

p.

p.

96.

97.

^^Charles Schott land, "Social Security Amendments of
1956: A Summary and Legislative History," Social Security
Bulletin, 19 (September, 1956), p. 5.
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Priority was given to workers over 65 years of age
(or within six months of 65 years)

.

While 57 percent of the decisions

for allowance of the disability freeze were granted
to persons
65 years or older,

of the remaining 43 percent, one-half were

in the age group 60-64.^^

Thus, the disability freeze, at

least initially, was directed toward the elderly workers

rather than toward the young and middle-aged workers.

Institution of Disability Insurance Program
In 1955 members of Congress became concerned over the

high costs of the Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
(APTD) public assistance program.

Expenditures for APTD had

risen to $225 million in 1955 and one-half of this amount was

paid to disabled persons under fifty years of age.
to provide some remedy for these high costs,

ability insurance measure

w^as

In order

in 1955 a dis-

introduced into the Fiouse of

Representatives as part of the omnibus Social Security
amendments bill.

consisted of

a

The disability provision in the Fiouse bill

recommendation to reduce the age of eligi-

bility for benefits under the social insurance provisions
for those disabled from sixty-five to fifty years of age.

The Senate Finance Committee conducted open hearings
on the bill in the early months of 1956.

groups

(e.g.,

the AMA, the U.S.

A number of interest

Chamber of Commerce) voiced

opposition to the disability insurance features.
^"^Social

Their

Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical

Supplement, 1955, p.

2.
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concern centered upon the possibility that this program

would eventually lead to

a

national health insurance system.

After some bargaining in

a

conference committee over the

House and Senate versions of the new program, the bill

finally passed in 1956.
With the formal establishment of the Disability

Insurance program in July 1957, disability insurance benefits

were paid for the first time to persons between the ages of
50 and 65 years who were afflicted with total and permanent

disabilities.

The new law was implemented in the same

manner as the disability freeze of 1954, that is, by state
agencies in each of the states.

ability Delerminiiig Units, are

These agencies, or Distlie

principal administrative

structures implementing the program.

Since these DDU

’

make

s

the major decisions in determining whether or not a dis-

ability claimant will or will not receive benefits, any
inquiry into the importance of the states in the decision-

making process of the Disability Insurance program must focus
on these agencies and their role in determining the percentage

of disability allowances for claimants in the states.

This

analysis will be included in the discussion of the political

system variables in Chapter VI.
The method of financing the new Disability Insurance

program was similar to that used in the OASI programs, i.e.,
that of

a

completely federal funded insurance strategy.

(This

differed from the old grant-in-aid approach utilized in the

.
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APTD program.)

Beginning in 1957. an additional tax (com-

bined employer-employee) of one-half of one percent on
wages
of employees and of three- eighths of one percent on
income
of self-employed was imposed to cover the costs of the
new

program

38

Qualifications for the receipt of disability benefits
included the following requirements:

(1)

the person had to

be both fully and currently insured under the Old-Age Insur-

ance program;

(2)

he had to have worked for twenty quarters

in covered employment during the forty-quarter period that

ended with the quarter in which the disability began:
in addition,

(3)

he had to have a disability that would either

result in deatli or be of long and indefinite duration; and
(4)

the potential beneficiary had to wait six months before

the receipt of benefits, so as to rule out the possibility
of temporary disability.

39

The amount of the monthly benefits was to be the

same as the "prime insurance amount," computed as though
the worker had become entitled to OASI benefits in the first

month of his waiting period.

In the OASI programs,

who worked in covered employment for
time rctceived

a

a

a

worker

specific length of

cash payment upon reaching 65 years of age,

based upon his average earnings at the time of his retirement.

In regard to the DI program,

^^Schott land

,

p.

5.

^^

Ibid

worker's disab?.lity pay-

a

.

,

p.

4.
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ment would be calculated on the basis of his earnings
at the
time of incurring the disability.

Unlike the OASI programs,

in the Disability Insurance program there was no
earnings

test, whereby benefits would be suspended because a person’s

earnings exceeded

a

specified amount*, the definition of

disability precluded payment of disability insurance to anyone engaged in substantial gainful activity.
As with the disability freeze legislation, vocational

rehabilitation played an important role in the Disability
Insurance program.

Applicants for disability benefits were

to be referred to the state Vocational Rehabilitation Agency

for possible rehabilitation therapy, and monthly insurance

benefits could be suspended if

a

beneficiary refused to

accept rehabilitation services without good cause.

After the institution of the Disability Insurance
program, the disability freeze provisions still remained in
They provided disabled persons under 50 years of

effect.

age an opportunity to have their period of disability counted

worktime requirements for their Old-Age

as part of their

Insurance and possible Disability Insurance benefits, if the

disability was permanent and lasted until they reached age
Besides

50.

provision for adult workers between the

a

ages of 50 and 65 who became permanently disabled, the Social
40
^

41

Ibid

.

,

p

.

4

bid

.

,

p

.

4

I

.

Ibid

.

,

p

.

4

4 2

,
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Security Amendments of 1956 included, within the framework
of the Disability Insurance program,

disabled children of

a

provision for dependent

a

deceased or retired insured worker.

This measure provided that if such

a

child had become totally

disabled before reaching age 18, that child would be included
in the Disability Insurance program.

The same considerations

regarding the permanency of the disability and the obligation
to accept rehabilitation services were applied here as to the

major adult insurance program.
Finally, the initial provisions of the Disability

Insurance program required that the amount of benefits paid
to a disabled person be reduced by the amount he or she

received from any other disability program.

This would include

benefits from such programs as APTD or any federal or state

workmen’s compensation programs received because of
claimant's physical or mental impairment.

a

44

Post-1956 Disability Insurance Amendments
There have been several important amendments to the
initial laws instituting the Disability Insurance program in
1956.

The 1958 amendment extended disability insurance

dependents' benefits to all those persons dependent upon

a

disabled person, including wives, dependent retired husbands.
^^

Ibid

.

,

p.

5.

"Old Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance’ Early Problems and Operations of the Disability
Provisions," Social Secu rity Bulletin 20 (December, 1957)
'^^Arthur Hess,

,

p

.

12.

.
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a.nd

children disabled prior to 18 years of age.

The ainendnient

also eliminated the tax offset provision which required the

amount of benefits received from other federal or state

disability compensation programs to be deducted from the
amount paid under the Disability Insurance program.
In the Social Security Amendments of 1960,

there

were two important provisions regarding the Disability
Insurance program.

The first consisted of a measure to

abolish the minimum age of 50 years for receipt of disability
insurance benefits.

Henceforth, disabled workers of any age

cou3d receive benefits provided that they met the requirement
of having worked twenty quarters in

a

covered employment and

were permanently and totally disabled according to the program's
The second major provision of the

definition of disability.
amendment granted that

allowed

a

a

disability beneficiary would be

period of 12 months of trial work during which

time the benefits or freeze to w'hich he was entitled would
be continued.

Benefits to

a

beneficiary who recovered during

this period would be continued for two months after the

month in which he recovered
The 1965 Social Security Amendment eliminated the

requirement that

a

worker's disability be expected to be of

^^^Susan Campbell, p.
p.

100;

Congre'ss and the Nation

,

1288.

^^Congress and the Nation, p. 1288; William Mitchell,
"Social Security Legislation in the 86th Congress," Social
Security Bulletin. 23 (November, 19601, p. 3.
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"long-continued and indefinite duration.”

The new law pro-

vided that this particular eligibility requirement
could be
fulfilled of the disability could be expected to result
in
death, or had continued or could be expected to continue
for
a

continuous period of not less than twelve calendar months. 47

Also in 1965 disability benefits were extended to those

persons becoming blind before the age of 31 if they had

worked in covered employment for six quarters or for one-half
of the time between the age of 21 and the onset of their dis-

ability.

Prior to this amendment, persons were required to

have worked five of the previous ten years before the onset
of their blindness.

48

The 1967 Social Security Amendment extended to all

persons disabled before the age of 31
insured status requirement.

a

less stringent

Persons from age 24 to 31 were

now required to have 50 percent of the quarters in which they
v\'orked

from age 21 in covered employment.

Persons w'ith an

onset of disability before age 24 needed one-half of the

qua rters from age 21 to 24 in covered employment.
1

49

Disability

*7

Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball, "Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Summary and Legislative History,” Social
Security Bulle tin. 23 (September, 1965), p. 14.
^ ^o n g r e s_s and the Nation ( 1965-1968): A Review of
Govern ment and Po l itics (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Service, 1969), p. 759.

^^Wilbur J. Cohen and Robert M. Ball, "Social
Security Amendments of 1967: Summary and Legislative History,”
Social Security Bulletin, 31 (February, 1968) p. 11.

.

.
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benefits were extended to blind persons age 55 or older
who
were not able to work in their previous employment.

No

substantial gainful activity standard was to be used in the
case of this category of claimants.

Also in 1967 disabled widows and disabled dependent

widowers became eligible to reduced benefits at age 50; the
actual amount of benefits was relative to the age of entitle”
ment

,

i.e.

,

at age

50

50

,

percent of the spouse's primary

insurance amount; at age 60, 71.5 percent of the amount;
and at age 62, 82.5 percent of the primary insurance amount.

Disability for this category

of

claimants had to occur either

before the death of the spouse or within seven years after

his/her death
The 1967 amendment furthermore attempted

tion of the definition of disability.

ability required that

a

It noted

a

clarifica-

that dis-

claimant not be able to engage in

substantial gainful activity in any job which exists within
the "national economy," which the amendment defined as "work

which exists in significant numbers in the region in which
(the claimant)

he

lives or in several regions of the country,

but Without regard to whether
foy;

a

specific job vacancy exists

him, or whether he would be hired if he had applied for
- ^

Further discussion of the actual effect of this new

work."'^‘"

^^Co ngress and the Nat i on (1965-1968)

,

p.

759.

^^Cohen and Ball, "Social Security Amendments of 1967,"
pp

.

10- 11

^^Ibid.

,

p.

11.
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definition of disability will be presented in Chapter VI, in
the analysis of administrative decision-making process.

Conclusions
This chapter has provided an historical perspective
on the development of Social Security legislation, particularly
on the institution of the Disability Insurance program.

As

stressed in the introduction to this thesis, the study of the
DI program is to be seen from the perspective of a theory of

American federalism.

Thus the historical development traced

in this chapter must be seen within this context.

In the

second chapter it was concluded that the American political

system is best viewed from the perspective of cooperative
federalism.

The present chapter illustrates the accuracy of

this view of federalism.

Even during the Depression and

New Deal period, when pressure would have seemingly been

greatest for the institution of completely federal welfare
programs, the vast majority of the new programs granted the
states ample freedom to devise their own policies, albeit

within the framework of federal standards.

With the crea-

tion of the Disability Insurance program in 1956, once again
the notion of cooperative federalism manifested itself in

legislation which provided for national standards to be
created by the federal government but also for the opportunity
own
of state agencies to administer the program within their

jurisdictions.

Although the case of cooperation in regard to
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the disability program is not so clear as in the typical

grant-in-aid programs, nevertheless one can at least hypothesize that there will be points at which negotiated

coordination between the federal and state personnel will be
necessary for the effective implementation of the program.
A detailed analysis of these matters must wait until Chapter
VI, where the results of interviews conducted in several

states will be analyzed.

Besides the contention that the cooperative theory
of American federalism is accurate, it has been argued that

political culture plays

a

major role in the maintenance of

an effective system of cooperative federalism.

The movement

in counterpoint to the individualist and popular sovereignty

orientations to American government has helped to preserve
a

system of cooperative relations between the states and to

keep the balance from tipping too far in the direction of

either the states or the federal government.

Again the

historical material dealt with in this chapter illustrates
the tension that exists between proponents of limited govern-

ment and those who favor increased governmental (usually
federal)

involvement in social welfare and health programs.

The significant strengths of both viewpoints also points to
an explanation of the continuing cooperative relations of

the states and federal government in the formulation and

implementation of public policy.

With specific reference to

the Disability Insurance program, this tension once again
I
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manifested itself in the manner of implementation of the
program; that is, the federal government has been allowed to

formulate general policy but the states are called upon to

administer that policy.
political system is

a

Thus, the fact that the American

federal system and the fact that the

American system operates within

a

particular cultural milieu

has important consequences for the manner in which public

policy decisions are resolved.

CHAPTER

I

V

IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES ON
THE DISABILITY PROGRAM

Introduction
The preceding chapters dealing with federalism and

with the history of the development of the Disability Insurance program have supported the position that, even with the

growing importance of the federal government, the states do
retain

a

vital role in our federal system and furthermore that

the struggle over the initiation of disability insurance

reflects this fact through the establishment of the state

Disability Determining Units as the basic decision-making
agencies in determining who will receive disability benefits.
The analysis will now turn to the impact of selected socio-

economic variables on the functioning of the Disability
Insurance program in the states, i.e., in terms of the

variability in the disability insurance allowance rates
among the states.

This analysis will be followed in the

next two chapters with discussions of the impact of the input and political system variables upon the dependent variable.

Levels of Decision-Making in the
Disability Program
The common dependent variable to Avhich the socio72

^
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economic, input, and political system variables
are to be
correlated is the variability in the allowance rates
for

disability insurance benefits among the states.

In order

to attain a better understanding of the meaning
of allowances

(and denials) within the context of the Disability
Insurance

program, it is useful here to discuss the levels of adminis-

trative decision-making at which all owances and denials are
made.

This will provide a context for further elaboration of

the exact meaning of the dependent variable.

Analysis of the

actual decision-making process within the Disability Determining units in the states will be presented in Chapter VI

.

Disability benefit claims are initiated at the federal
level in any one of the 800 Social Security District Offices.
The function of the District Office is to interview the

claimant and to obtain from him the necessary OASDHI earnings
data to determine whether there is technical eligibility for

disability insurance.

Until 1971 the District Office had

the further responsibility of obtaining from the claimant

and his physician the former's medical records,

indicating

the nature and extent of the supposed disability.
the state Disability Determining Units

Since then,

(DDU's) have taken

over this task of acquiring medical data.

This change allows

the state agencies to become involved in the claimant's case

^The following analysis has relied heavily upon the
work of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., in S ocial Security and Mass
Justice- -A Problem in Welfare Adjudication (Praeger Publishers,
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at the very outset of the determination process.

At the

District Office, approximately fifteen to twenty percent of
the claims are denied for technical reasons, such as lack of
the sufficient number of quarters in covered employment.^
If a claimant is not denied for a technical reason,

then a state examiner in the DDU makes a decision on whether
or not the claimant is in fact disabled, utilizing federal

rules and regulations as guidelines.

The standards used in

making decisions and the amount of flexibility involved from
examiner to examiner or from agency to agency will be discussed in Chapter VI.
Until 1972 all of these initial determinations made
by the state DDU

'

s

were reviewed by the Bureau of Disability

Insurance (BDI), the federal agency in charge of the adminis-

tration of the DI program.

Since that time, BDI policy has

been to review only five percent of the cases.

3

.

•

Explaining

this action, BDI has argued that the five-percent sampling

method allows an adequate check on the operations of the state
agencies and also for more intensive analysis of the decisions

made in the sample survey."^

Although this may be the case,

switching from 100 percent review to five percent review also
means that EDI can only question the decisions on
Ibid

.

,

p

.

26

Ibid.

,

a

small

p.' 28.

^U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Disability Insurance Program, Staff Report (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 28.
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percentage of the cases decided by the state agencies, thus
giving the DDU

'

s

more control over the decisions they make.

Moreover, under both the old and new procedure,
BD I must consult with the state DDU

'

when it considers

s

a

denial decision by the latter to be in error, although this
is not

necessary when BDI concludes that an allowance decision

should be reversed.

In both cases BDI has the explicit right

to review decisions made by the DDU

'

s

,

but the requirement for

consultation in some cases indicates again that the states
do not have simply a passive role in the administration of

the program.
\Vhen a
a

claimant is denied an insurance claim, he has

period of six months in which to request

of his case.

a

reconsideration

This reconsideration process is virtually iden-

tical to the initial determination outlined above.

consideration level of the decision-making process

The reis not

prescribed by statute but is authorized by Social Security

Administration (SSA) regulations in order to provide

a

second attempt to correct "erroneous” denials before the

hearing examiner level of decision making.^

During the re-

consideration stage, all of the state DDU’s decisions are
reviewed by BDI.

As in the initial consideration stage, BDI

must consult w^ith the state administrators if it considers
a

denial decision by the latter to be in error.
c;

“Dixon, p.

32.

Reversals
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of previous denial decisions at the initial level is about
30 percent during the reconsideration process.^

If upon reconsideration the claimant is once again

denied benefits, then the case goes to the Hearing Examiner
or Administrative Law Judge, attached to SSA's Bureau of

Hearing and Appeals (BHA).^

At this level the claimant has

the right to appear personally, and as in the other two

levels of decision-making, has the right to be represented
by counsel.

New information concerning the claim may be pre-

Unlike the reviews at BDI

sented.

,

the hearing examiner may

O

reverse

a

state agency denial.

previous denials by the DDU

'

s

The rate of reversals of

and BDI

is about

53 percent.

9

If the claimant is denied benefits by the hearing

examiner, he may seek

a

hearing by the Appeals Council,

although the Council may deny the claimant's request for
The Council may review, affirm, modify, or reverse

review.

the decision of the hearing examiner.

Unless the claimant commences

a

civil action in

a

District Court, the denial decision of the Appeals Council
In case the Council does not agree to hear the

is final.

case, then the decision of the Hearing Examiner is final.

Any decision, however, made anywhere in the disability deterf-

1

Staff Report, p. 32.
bid

.

,

p

^^Ibid.

,

p.

I

.

36

.

31.

.

.

Dixon, p.'34.

^Staff Report, p. 32.
^^Dixon, p. 46.
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mination process may be reopened for "good cause" (for
example, new evidence which would have

a

bearing on the

case) within four years after the final decision.

In the

case of purported fraud, a case may be reopened at any time.

Disability Awards Variability as
Dependent Variable
It is within this

framework of levels of decision-

making that examiners in the DDU

'

s

determine whether or not

an applicant will receive disability benefits.

DDU

’

s

Although the

are involved in both the initial and reconsideration

stages of the process, the disability dependent variable

discussed in this study will be confined to the initial

determination level.

The dependent variable consists of the

ratio between awards and denials of disability insurance
Since the population used

benefits among the states in 1970.

for the measurement of awards and that used for the measure-

ment of denials is not identical,

a

ratio of awards to denials

has been presented as the most accurate form of the dependent

variable.

Although the time frames for the measurement of

each aspect of the dependent variable, i.e., the percentage
of awards and percentage of denials, are not identical, they

closely approximate each other and both fall within the 1970
time frame.

For these reasons, it is not technically

correct to speak of the percentage of awards or percentage
of denials when discussing the dependent variable.

However,
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because the ratio is symptomatic of

a

measurement of award

and denial percentages, it may be translated into
age and will be referred to in

thi*:

a

percent-

way in the analysis.

The data on the variability of disability benefit percentages
is derived from an analysis of all the states together and

this precludes any discussion of award percentages for any

particular state.
In discussing the variability of disability award

percentages among the states, it is worth remembering that
this is supposedly a federal program in which the state

agencies only implement the federal statutes and adminis-

trative rules and regulations.

administrative implementation

The goal of "uniformity” in
is

one of the major tasks con-

fronting the Bureau of Disability Insurance.

Review pro-

cedures outlined above, frequent use of memoranda, further

specification of rules and regulations, and other attempts
to inculcate the purpose and governing regulations of the

disability insurance program into the perspective of the disability examiners is
agency.
a

a

principal function for the federal

This type of continuous supervision should point to

situation in which percentages of awards and denials among

the states vary only in a minimal way.
Tlie

analysis of the variability in the ratio of

aivards to denials of disability insurance benefits among the

states indicates that this assumption is not true.

Statis-

tics on awards and denials by state Disability Determining
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Units in 1970, issued by BDI and used in this study as

a

ratio of awards to denials of benefits among the states,
shows that the ratios vary from 41 percent to 71 percent

among the states, with the mean at 52 percent.
to Chapter IV, pp

.

97-98.)

(See Appendix

Thus some states approached

a

ratio of 41 percent awards to 59 percent denials, while others

were closer to
denials.

a

ratio of 71 percent awards to 29 percent

These figures indicate quite

a

large span of

variability among the states in providing claimants with
disability benefits to which they presumably feel they are
entitled.

This conclusion is not incongruent with the basic

hypothesis of the thesis, however, that the states in fact
are able to exert tlioir influence even when administering a

completely federally funded program.

Identification of Independent
Socio-Economic Variables
Having shown that the dependent disability variable
does in fact vary to

a

significant degree among the states,

it is now appropriate to begin an analysis of some of the

proposed factors which should explain this variation.
suggested in Hypothesis Three on page

3

of Chapter I,

expected that socio-economic cliaracter is t ics
a

,

As
it is

which constitute

part of the environment of the political system, have an

impact on the variability of disability benefit award per

centages among the states.

Thirteen socio-economic variables

>

.
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have been selected for use in this study.

The rationale for

the selection of each of the variables will
be discussed in
the next section of this chapter.

Table

1

listing of these socio-economic variables.

provides

a

As with the

dependent disability variable, the percentages of the socioeconomic characteristics refer to the states combined.

Cor-

relations between these independent variables and the dependent variable apply to the states as an aggregate and not to

any individual state.

Table

1

Listing of Socio-Economic Variables

—

1.

Median Age

2.

%

3.

labor force
unemployed

4

Median years of education of population

8.

labor force working in
Central Business District

9.

% persons using public
transportation to go to work

18-65 in labor force

%

10.
.

1

%

5.

population with
vocational education

6.

Median family income

7.

%

population living in the
5 years ago

11

Mean social security income
per family

12.

% people leaving labor force
from 1960 to 1970

I—

%

%

foreign born

%

same house as

of population non-white

In order to simplify the analysis and to give greater

focus to the independent variables, soci-o - economi c character-

istics of similar type have been grouped into categories.

This procedure allows the number of variables to be reduced
from thirteen individual variables to eight categories of

similar type variables.

These categories are listed in Table

2,

.

.
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Table

2

Categories of Variables

Category

Variable(s) in Category

1

Age Status

1

Median age

2.

Employment Status

2.

1
%
%

(1)

18-65 in labor force (2)
labor force unemployed (3)
leaving labor force (12)

3.

Income Status

3.

Median family income (6)
Mean social security income
per family (11)

4.

Migration Status

4.

^

5.

Race

5.

%

6.

Ethnicity

6.

%

7.

Spatial Status

7.

^

living in same house (10)
of population nonwhite (13)

population foreign
born (7)
of persons taking public

transportation to work
8.

Education

8

.

%

(9)

population with vocational
training (5)
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Hypotheses on Relationships Between SES
Variables and Disability RateJ
In previous studies considering the relationships

between socio-economic characteristics and welfare type
policies in the states, researchers have usually found

a

strong correlation between measures of socio-economic development and the level of welfare services.

sistent conclusion of

a

This has been

a con-

number of articles and books published

on the subject during the last decade or more.

It

is

impor-

tant to keep in mind, however, that these studies have focused

on those programs which award benefits to people on the basis
of economic "need," rather with those based upon the insur-

ance principle, in which benefits are awarded to persons who

participate in the program and qualify under its regulations.
Research reported by Richard Dawson and James Robinson as early as 1963 provided

a

corrective to the then

predominant view that the type of party system in

a

state

was the primary factor in determining the level of welfare

policies in

a

state.

“

Dawson and Robinson concluded that

the socio-economic condition of the states was

a

greater

determinant of the level of welfare policy than such political
factors as inter-party competition and voting turnout.

The

specific socio-economic characteristics that they found to be

^^Richard E. Dawson and James A Robinson, "InterParty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies
25 (May, 1963)
in the American States," Jo urnal of Politics
265-289.
,

I

6
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the most fruitful predictors were measures of
the wealth of
a

state, and the levels of urban and industrial
development.

This conclusion was supported in

a

comprehensive study by

Thomas Dye, in which he showed that socio-economic environments (including educational level of the state population,
as well as the variables used in the Dawson and Robinson

study) of state political systems accounted for a higher

percentage of the variance among the states in their welfare
policies than did any other determinants.^^

Since the

publication of Dye's study in 1965, his conclusions have
been tempered somewhat by further research of other scholars,
but they do tend to substantiate his conclusions about the

influence of socio-economic characteristics on the decisionmakers within the political system.
In regard to this study,

involving

a

program whicli

docs not grant benefits on the basis of economic need but

utilizes the criterion of incapacitating disability, one
can expect that the relationships between socio-economic

characteristics

aTid

the rates of disability benefit awards

among the states will not simply duplicate the types of
relationsliips discovered in the analysis of welfare programs.

Theiefore,

tlio

categories of independent variables must be

'^Thomas
Pub lic

(Ch.icago:

Dye, Politics, Economics, and
Rand McNally, 19 6
R.

tlie

Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy,"
American Political Science Review, 63 (September, 1969)
^"^Ira

8l)7-~8''rr.
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discussed in terms of their likely relationship to
the

percentage of disability benefit awards, within the context
of the design of the Disability Insurance program.

The

program design must in effect dictate the hypothesis offered
in the case of the relationship of a particular socio-

economic characteristic with the dependent variable.

way it will be possible to determine;

socio-economic characteristics as

a

(1)

In this

whether or not

whole have an impact on

the variance of awards of disability insurance among the states;

and (2) whether it is only those socio-economic variables

which, according to the program design, are permitted to

account for variance in the award rates which do in fact

explain the variance in the levels of the dependent variable
in the various states.

Within the design of the Disability Insurance program,
it

is

expected that ratios of awards to denials of disability

benefits will vary among the states according to the social
and economic profiles of the particular states.

In fact,

socio-economic characteristics are supposed to explain all
of the variation in the levels of awards and denials of

disability benefits among the states.

However, not all

socio-economic variables are seen as legitimate determinants
of benefit variance.

Therefore, by means of the selection of

socio-economic characteristics which should account for
variance and those which should indicate no correlation
the dependent variable, one should be able to determine

w'ith
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whether or not the program is being administered according
to the goals of a federal Disability Insurance policy or

whether in fact the state decision-makers are being influenced by criteria which are not applicable to this type
of program or at least to its explicit design.

However, determining which of the specified socio-

economic characteristics are "legitimate’’ predictors of dis-

ability benefits and which are in violation of the program's
intent is enormously difficult.

This is the case because

the original conception of the program, i.e., that an

applicant should receive benefits only when it had been

medically determined that the disability prevented substantial
gainful activity, was altered by the process ultimately

utilized to determine who should receive such benefits.

For

example, as will be noted in more detail in Chapter VI, it
is

possible for an applicant to receive benefits even if the

disability is "equivalent to" those for which benefits are

specifically authorized, and if the claimant's education and
work history is such that employment is unlikely.
is that

The point

modifications in themselves suggest that benefits

could be given to "need" oriented clients even though the

disability might not warrant such

a

decision.

Given this development in the program.'

s

operation,

three categories of socio - econom.ic characteristics will be

established:

tlie

first for characteristics v;hich are clearly

related to the insurance orientation of the program; the

86

second, where benefits are given based on characteristics

which are not clearly related to the severity of the disability but upon other mitigating circumstances which at
least raise questions about their relationship to the

insurance orientation of the program; and last,

a

category

of socio-economic characteristics which apparently influence

the awarding of benefits even though they are factors which

relate to need rather than the severity of the disability.
The age of the applicant is the only variable which

fits into the first category.

This is because the initial

assumption, in line with the design of the Disability Insurance program, is that, as
age,

a

state’s population increases in

there will be a higher percentage of disability awards

to the percentage of denials.

The disability program was

originally designed to provide benefits to disabled persons

between the ages of

50 and

65 years,

thus assuming that the

older members of the population are more susceptible to

disabilities than are the younger.

Previous studies focusing

on more restricted sample surveys have found that disability

recipients tend to fall within the higher age brackets, thus
giving added weight to the hypothesis presented here.^^
The second category of variables consists of education,

race,

and ethnicity.

In regard to education,

it

is

^^Phoebe H. Goff, "Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries
under OASDHI Regional and State Patterns," Social Security
Bull etin 36 (September, 1973), see Table 3, p. 93j and
Henry Brehm, "The Disabled on Public Assistance," in Social
Security Bulletin, 33, pp.' 26-30; see Table 3, p. 93.
:

,
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assumed that the more educated

a

state’s population, the

lower will be the disability benefit award percentage.
is

This

because it is permitted, as already noted, for the DDU

examiners to take into consideration the educational level
of claimants in those cases in which
is not

a

claimant's disability

so severe that he would be granted benefits

A claimant

s

immediately.

level of educational background, therefore, may

partially determine whether or not he will receive disability
benefits.

Furthermore, studies conducted prior to this one

have shown that disability beneficiaries tend to be persons

with lower educational backgrounds.^^

However, these findings

do not negate the point that the consideration of educational

levels rather than disability severity at least raises the

possibility that benefits can be given under such circumstances
for applicants who are poorly educated and therefore are

unable to find employment given their disability rather than
on the basis of

tlie

precise nature of the disability.

The last two variables in this second category are

race and ethnicity.

Previous studies have shown that non-white

and other minorities account for

a

higher percentage of the

total number of beneficiaries than their percentage of the

^^Brehm, see Table 4, p. 93; and Kathryn H. Allan
and Milfred E. Cinsky, "General Characteristics of the Disabled Population," Social Security Bulletin, 35 (August, 1972),
pp. 24-37.

.
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population would normally indicate.

It could be argued

that these characteristics are indeed related to the issue
of the nature of

disability since it

a

case that these people have

a

is

most likely the

greater tendency to be

employed in more physically demanding jobs and therefore
have a greater propensity for incurring disabilities.
ever,

How-

it could also be suggested that the issue of an appli-

cant's race or ethnicity results in benefits being awarded on
the assumption that, because of the applicant's race or

ethnicity, job opportunities will be less likely given the

claimed disability.

If this

is

the case, then the issue of

need is at least partially present.

Distinct from the first two classifications of

variables are the following socio-economic characteristics
which, according to the disability program design, should
shovv'

no relationship with the dependent variable.

These

variables -- spat ial status, employment status, income status,
and migration status- -are used in order to determine the

extent to which federal rules, regulations, and other program

controls are effective in guiding the actions of the decision-

makers in the DDU

'

s

The special status category includes two distinct

components: the percent of persons with their place of work

within the central business district and

a

measurement of

^'Phoebe Goff, see Table 3, p. 93; Goff, "Disabled
Beneficiary Population, 1957-1966," Social Security Bulletin
32- 4 2; see Table 3, p. 93; and Brehm, see
34 (July, 1971), pp
Table 3 p. 93.
,

.
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the availability of public transportation in a person's

residential area (i.e., for the purposes of transportation
to his place of employment)

where there is

a

.

It

assumed that in areas

is

higher percentage of people who work within

the central business district, there will be a lower per-

centage of award recipients; and that in areas with more

adequate public transportation facilities there will be

a

negative impact upon the percentage of disability awards.
Both aspects of the spatial status category therefore should

explain some of the variance in the dependent variable, because
they will affect the possibilities of

a

claimant engaging in

substantial gainful activity in his area of residence.

Yet,

as Chaptei VI will suggest, a Congressional amendment to the

Social Security Act in 1967 explicitly stated that benefits

were not to be given merely because an individual was unable
to find employment in the area of his residence.

Given this

restriction, awarding of benefits on the assumption that

claimant will not be able to find

a

a

job in his area of resi-

dence runs counter to the expressed design of the disability

insurance program.
The employment status category is utilized in order
to determine whether or not there is an association between
a

state’s employment situation and the percentage of dis-

ability benefit a\;ards to claimants.

Since the program under

study is an insurance program and not a welfare program

based simply upon economic need, there should be no correla-
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tion between

eiriployinent

status and the percentage of dis-

benefit awards among the states.

situacion in

a

particular area

The employment

is not one of the

criteria

which DDU examiners are supposed to take into consideration
in making judgments about the eligibility of claimants for

disability benefits.
The income status category can be viewed as another

indicator of whether or not the disability program is being

administered in the states as an insurance program or as
welfare program based upon economic need.

a

In a welfare type

program, it might be plausible to suggest that states with
lower levels of median family income probably have

a

higher

percentage of welfare recipients than do states with higher
levels of median income.

In regard to the Disability Insur-

ance program, however, such reasoning is inappropriate,

since

tlie

program

is

entirely federal - funded and adminis-

trators are not supposed to take into account in making

determinations the income level of the claimants.

Any

correlation between income status and the percentage of
claimants receiving disability awards will, therefore,
suggest that administrators are not conforming to the

explicit design of the disability program.

Migration status, consisting of the percentage of
people 18-64 years of age who have participated in interstate,
1970,

intra-state, or inter-county migration from 1965 to
is

the final variable within the classification of

8
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variable which should not relate to the dependent variable.

Migration may be considered

a

function of unemployment, rather

than of unemployability because of disability.
that there will be

a

It

is

assumed

greater tendency for people who move

about to be unfamiliar with the job situation in their par-

ticular area of residence and therefore to use

a

disability

impairment as an opportunity to benefit from some type of

unemployment compensation.
Impact of Socio-Economic Variables on
the Disability Award Rates

Having presented the hypotheses concerning each of
the categories of variables,

it is now possible to proceed

to the analysis of the effect of the socio-economic character-

istics on the percentage of benefit awards to claimants

among the states.

The analysis here has utilized the
This procedure

statistical technique of multiple regression.

allows one to measure the combined effect of a number of

independent variables on

a

dependent variable.

1

The

closeness of association between the independent and

dependent variables can be indicated by the mult iple- correlation coefficient

(R)

•

It

is,

however, more useful to report

the square of the mult iple- correlation coefficient
is

(R

)

which

referred to as the coefficient of multiple determination.

It indicates the percentage of the variance in the dependent

^^Dennis Palumbo, Statistics in Political an d
Behavioral Science (New York: Apploton-Ccntury-Ci of ts
p

.

210.

,

1969),
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Gxpla.in.Gd by thG

var iablGS

.

combinGd GffGct of thG indGpGndGnt

^^

When thG socio-Gconomic charactGr ist ics arG corrGlatGd

with thG dGpGndGnt variablG, thG rGsults indicatG that thG
thirtGGn indGPGndGnt variablGs Gxplain 64 pGrcGnt of tho

variancG in tho dopondont variablo.

Although this is

a

sub-

stantial pGTCGntagG of thG variancG in thG IgvgI of disability
award ratGS among tho statGS, it is loss than ono might

GxpGCt sincG thG program was intont ionally dosignod to procludG any dotorminants of variation Gxcopt socio- Gconomic
factors.

ConsGquGnt ly

,

it would appoar that othor unknown

factors have entered into the picture.

The possibility that

input characteristics and aspects of the political system

itself have an impact on the administration of the program
will be explored in Chapters V and VI of this thesis.

When the significant variables were divided into the
three categories according to their theoretical relationships

with dependent variable, the following results were obtained.

Median age was the only variable eligible for the first
category, which consisted of any variable which, according
to

the design of the Disability Insurance program, was per-

mitted to influence the awarding of disability benefits.

The

coT'relation in this case did not prove to be statistically

significant, and so no conclusion about the impact of the age

variable can be presented.
^^Ibid.

,

p.

214.
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In the second category of variables,

those which

manifested an ambiguous relationship to the dependent
variable, all three of the variables proved to be significant,

They are listed in Table

together with the amount

3,

of variance in the dependent variable which each one

explains.

The ethnicity variable is the most important

predictor, explaining ten percent of the variance in the
award percentages among the states.

The second variable

listed in the table is education, which adds five percent
to the total variance explained.

Race is the third variable,

which adds an additional three percent to the variance
explained and brings the total to 18 percent.

These findings

at least suggest tliat there are ambiguities in the adminis-

tration of the Disability Insurance program in the states,
since these socio-economic variables have been hypothesized
to be at least potentially of a type which should not mani-

fest any correlation with the dependent variable.

Table

3

Significant Variables in Category Two

Variable

R^

Ethnicity

10%

Education

5%

Race

3%

Total

18%
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More conclusive findings are available from
the
analysis of the third category of socio-economic
characteristics and their impact upon the variance in the
disability

benefit award rates in the states.

All four of the variables

in this category proved to be statistically
significant and

they are listed in Table

4.

As the table indicates, migra-

tion status is by far the most important predictor, alone

explaining 28 percent of the variance in the benefit award

percentages among the states.

Also of prime importance is

the employment status variable which accounts for an addi-

tional 12 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.
Finally, income status and spatial status contribute three

percent to the total explained variance of 46 percent for
the variables in this third category.

Even more than with the

variables in the second category, the results of these
correlations must be judged within the context of the disability program design, which indicates the effect that any

particular variable should have upon the benefit award
levels among the states.

From this perspective, one comes to

the rather surprising conclusion that nearly two-thirds of the

variance explained by the socio-economic variables (46 out of
64 percent)

is

accounted for by the socio-economic character-

istics in this third category which should, theoretically,

show no correlations with the levels of awards and denials of

disability benefits.

As was indicated in the hypotheses for

each of these variables, the expressed purpose of the Disability
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Insurance program, in regard to its administrative implementation, was to eliminate the possibility that factors such as

migration status and employment status would influence the
decisions of state DDU administrators in making allowance
and denial determinations.

These findings bolster the con-

clusions of the analysis in regard to the second category of

variables and, furthermore, compound the inadequacy of any

conclusion that socio-economic characteristics alone can
explain the variance among the states in the levels of
awards and denials of disability insurance benefits.
Table

4

Significant Variables in Category Three

Variable

Migration Status

281

Employment Status

12%

Income Status

3%

Spatial Status

3%

Total

46%

The conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis

must be tentative.

Because of the design of the disability

program and the complex of federal statutes, rules, and
regulations instituted to insure that the st ates administer
the program along strict federal guidelines, the percentage

of variance in the award/denial rates among the states
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explained by the socio-economic variables is too low.

Further-

more, many of the variables which, according to the design of
the prograjti, should not have had an impact upon the variance
in the dependent variable,

in fact did manifest sometimes

strong correlations with levels of disability awards among
the states.

Obviously, the number of socio-economic character-

istics used in this study was limited, and therefore no rigid

conclusions should be inferred from the analysis.

However,

the possible independence of the state DDU administrators

from the strict federal guidelines set down for the adminis-

tration of the program, as evidenced by the findings presented
in this chapter, points to the appropriateness of considering

the impact of input and political system characteristics

upon the disability insurance benefit award levels among the
states.

This will be the task of the following two chapters.

:

97

Appendix to Chapter IV
Further explanation of the nature and method of
acquis ition of the data constituting the dependent variable
is appropriate.

Data on the awards and denial rates of

disability benefits of the state Disability Determining
Units
ance

(DDU’s) was provided by the Bureau of Disability Insur(BDI)

of the Social Security Administration.

This data

was transformed into ratios of awards to denials of disability

benefits for each of the states, and the variance among the
states in these ratios from 41 percent to 71 percent is dis-

cussed in the text.

The variations of ratios among the

states can be seen more clearly by listing the various per-

centages together with the number of states which manifested

a

particular ratio of awards to denials of disability

benefits
centage

No.

of States

Percentage

No.

of States

41 %

1

54?ci

3

4 4 %

1

561

1

47 %
48 %

3

51 %
58 %

8

49%

4

2

50 %

11

51 %
52 %

2

55 %

2

60%
61%
62%
66%
71%

1

5

3
1
2
1

1

In order to confirm the accuracy of the 'data constituting the

dependent variable for this study, one might refer to Staff
Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means on the Dis-

,
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ability Insurance program.

2 0

In this report,

sented on the denial rates of the state DDU
from 1966 to 1973.

(Tables 41 and 42, pp

.

’

s

223-224)

range extending from 28 percent to 60 percent.
.

for the years

For

the average rate of denials was 44.7 percent, with the

1970,

pp

data is pre-

225- 226

•)

(Table 43,

This complements the average award rate of 52

percent presented here, thus indicating that the statistics
in both studies tend to confirm one another.

Incident ially

the ranges of percentages of denial rates for 1967 to 1973

listed in the House study show wide variations in these rates
over

a

period of several years, thus indicating that the data

for 1970 is by no means representative of an aberration in
the behavior of the DDU administrators.
20

Staff Report.

.

CHAPTER

V

INPUT VARIABLES AND VARIABILITY
IN DISABILITY AWARDS

Introduction
The results of the analysis of the relationship of

selected socio-economic characteristics and the variance
in the level of disability insurance benefit awards among

the states indicated that these environmental variables were

not able to account for the total variance in the dependent

variable.

Although as

a

whole they explain 64 percent of

the variance in the award/denial ratios, a significant per-

centage of the variance is left unexplained.

Furthermore,

individual socio-economic characteristics which contributed
to this percentage of explained variance did not manifest

relationships with the dependent variable that could be

considered appropriate given the design of the program and
the supposedly passive role of the state DDU examiners within
it
In order

to

ascertain other sources of explanation

for the variance in the disability awards, the analysis shall

follow the theoretical outline of the systems model discussed
in Chapter

I

and focus next upon the "input” characteristics

as potential explanatory variables.
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As explained in the
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earlier discussion of the systems model, inputs represent
the demands and supports being transmitted from the environ-

ments of the political system into the system itself.

The

level and intensity of inputs vary from state to state and

among the multifarious contending groups within each of the
states.

Moreover, the resources available to decision-makers

within the political systems are normally scarce, and this
necessitates responding in an unequal manner to the demands
placed upon the decision-makers.

This dynamic tension of

demands and responses, with the results depending in large

measure upon the structure of the input characteristics and
the resources of the political decision-makers, justifies
the assumption that input characteristics will have some im-

pact upon the variance in the disability insurance benefit
awards among the states.

,

Only

a

"neutral relationship," one

in which speculation on the positive or negative direction of
II

the relationship is not appropriate, can be expected in this
I

case, however.

i

In a program such as Disability Insurance,

in which active state political involvement is considerably

I

less than in the variety of welfare programs,

input character-

1

istics cannot be reasonably hypothesized to be so closely
I

associated with the levels of disability benefit awards as
I

to enable one to propose that the form.er will determine the

I

specific directional movement of the latter.
I

I

I

I

I
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Hypoth eses on Relationships Between Input
Variables and Disability Program
With these theoretical points in mind, the discussion
will turn to an elaboration of the specific input variables

selected for use in this study.
to be considered is

The first of the variables

inter-party competition in the states.

This variable measures the extent to which there are two

equally matched political parties in

state, each of which

a

has an opportunity of being elected as

a

majority to the

available offices in the legislative and executive branches.^
The theoretical assumption underlying the formation and use
of this variable by political scientists within the system's

framework is that the responsiveness of

a

state political

system will be conditioned in part by the likelihood that

political officials in one party will be replaced by those
in another if the former representatives are not responsive
to the demands of the public which they represent.

The importance of this assumption in stimulating

scholars to explore the relationships between degrees of

inter-party competition and types of public policy produced
by the political system can hardly be exaggerated.

For the

purposes of this study, however, it is sufficient to review
the discussion of researchers on the association between inter-

party competition and the v/elfare policy formulated in

a

^Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in
Politics in the Americ an
Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, eds
82-1-1
States, 2nd. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971),
.

,
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state political system.

There has been considerable debate

among scholars over the extent of the direct effect
of inter-

party competition on public policy in general and welfare
policy in particular.

The earlier studies of these relation-

ships were conducted by such students of American political

parties as V.O. Key, and many of his former students, including
Duane Lockard and John Fenton.
it ics

In a major study of Southern

Key found that those states which had bifactional

,

one-party systems were more likely than states with multifactional party systems to pursue more "liberal” welfare-type
policies.

Politics

Later, Lockard,
3

,

in his study of New England State

found that those states with two-party systems

(e.g., Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island)

insti-

tuted more liberal welfare policies than did states with one-

party systems, such as Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
These scholars concluded from their studies that inter-party

competition was

a

primary cause of the higher level of public

policy outputs in the states.
In 1966 Thomas Dye produced the most comprehensive

challenge to the older interpretation of the role of interparty competition in state politics.

Dye,

in a study of the

relationships between socio-economic characteristics, political
^V. 0. Key, Jr., Soutliern Politics in State and
Nation (New York: Knopf, 1951), see especially pp 298-314.
.

^Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959).

^

.

.
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input and system variables, and policy outputs,
concluded
that input variables such as inter-party competition
did
not have an independent effect upon policy.

He argued that

socio-economic characteristics were the piimary determinants
and that the effects of political inputs were negligible.^

Although Dye has repeated his conclusions in

a

later study,

other scholars have found that his conclusions needed to be
modified.

Two major efforts in this regard were published

by John Fenton, in People and Parties in Politics
Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert.^

,^

and by

Both of these studies

concluded that inter-party competition indeed did have

a

substantial effect upon the level of public policy in general
and welfare policy in particular.
In regard to the expected relationship between inter-

party competition and the variance in the levels of dis-

ability insurance benefits among the states, the hypothesis
(see Hypothesis Four on page 3, Chapter

will be

a

I)

is

that there

correlation between the two variables which will

indicate that inter-party competition is able to account for
Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, an d the Public
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966)
^Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prent ice -Hall 1972), Chapter 11.
,

^John H. Fenton, People and Parties in P olitics
(Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1966)
7

Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions
of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American
Politic al Science Review 63 (September, 1969), 867-879,
877.
esp
,

.

.
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some of the variance in the award levels.

That there should

be any relationship at all runs contrary to the policy
design

for the disability program, but the specific associations

discovered in the previous chapter lead one to expect that
other variables besides socio-economic ones could have an
impact upon the variance in the levels of disability benefit

awards
The second input variable selected for this study is

voter turnout.

This variable represents the percentage of

eligible voters who participate in state-wide elections.

For

the purposes of this study, state-wide elections will refer

only to elections for the governors of the states.

It

is

logical to assume that states with higher levels of voter

turnout have

a

greater percentage of citizens with interest

in political activity and a willingness to express their

wants and needs.

Higher levels of political input activity

place greater demands upon the political system decision-

makers to respond favorably to the desires of those participating.

As in the case of inter-party competition, there

has been a debate among political scientists over importance
of voter turnout as
of policies among

a

tlie

direct determinant of particular levels
states.

The major proponents of each

side of the discussion are the same.

Thomas Dye, in two

major studies, concluded that the importance of voter turnout as an independent variable is minimal when compared to
the overwhelming effect of socio-economic characteristics.

^See esp. Dye, Understanding Public Policy

,

pp

.

g

254-257.
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However, Sharkansky and Hofferbert found in their study
that

high voter participation was one of the most important
factors

in determining the level of welfare

spending in the states.^

Furthermore, Fry and Winter, in

a

study of the determinants of redistribution policies in the
states, concluded that political participation was strongly

associated with policies which address themselves to the
wants and needs of the lower income classes.

With the results of these studies in mind, one might

hypothesize (see Hypothesis Five on page

4,

Chapter

I)

that

there will be an explanatory relationship between the levels
of voting turnout in the states and the variance of disability

benefit awards among the states.

Any significant correlation

between these two variables will provide more evidence of the
impact of the states in the administration of this federal

program and support the findings in the previous chapter that
state DDU decision-makers do not simply follow the regulations
of the program in a passive manner.

The strength of interest groups in the states con-

stitutes the third

input variable for this analysis.

In

modern, urban- industrial societies, interest groups have been
one of the principal means for the articulation of demands by

those people who feel that the political system should respond

^Sharkansky and Hofferbert, p. 877.
"The Politics of
Redistribution," American Political Science Review 64 (June,
1970), 508-522.
^*^Brian Fry and Richard Winters,

,

.
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to their needs.

The number, strength, and amount of activity

by interest groups differs from state to state.

Harmon

Zeigler and Hendrik van Dalen concluded from their study of
interest group systems in the states that the strength of
these groups seemed to be inversely correlated to the degree
of inter-party competition in the states and also to the

socio-economic status of the states.

Thus, states with

stronger interest groups tend to have one-party systems and
lower levels of urbanization, industrialization, and per

capita income.

This conclusion serves to indicate that

states whose system of party competition is not adequate for
the articulation of needs of the various groups within the

states have developed more complex and active interest group

systems to compensate for the lack of competition among the

parties
In regard to the present study,

(see Hypothesis Six on page 4, Chapter

it
I)

hypothesized

is

that variance in

the strength of interest groups in the states will act,

in

analogous fashion to the two other input variables discussed
above, as an explanatory factor in accounting for the variance
in the disability benefit awards dependent variable.

^^Harmon Zeigler and Hendrik van Dalen, "Interest
Groups in the States," in Jacob and Vines, pp 122-160, esp.
p. 127; and Lewis Froman, "Some Effects 'of Interest Group
Strength in State Politics," American Political Science
Review, 60 (December, 1966), 952-962.
.

107

Impact of Input Variables on
Disability Program
The analysis of the relationships between the input

characteristics and the dependent disability insurance benefit
awards variable follows the same statistical procedures

specified in Chapter IV.

They include the use of the mul-

tiple regression technique to produce the coefficient of

multiple determination (R 2 ) which indicates the percentage
of the variance in the dependent variable explained by either
a

single independent variable or

of them.

a set

The results of the statistical analysis indicates
that two of the three input variables do show

a

moderate

explanatory association with the dependent variable, but
also that no more than tentative conclusions can be drawn
from these correlations.

Table

5

indicates that there

is

a

low to moderate

association between two of the input variables and the variance in the percentage of disability awards among the states.

Voting turnout proved to be the most useful variable in
explaining the variance in levels of disability insurance
awards granted to claimants by the DDU’s in the states.

interest groups variable indicates

a

The

relatively weak associa-

tion with the dependent variable and thus allows for only

tenuous inferences about its predictive value.

The inter

significant
party competition variable showed no statistically

correlation with the dependent variable.
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Table

5

Input Variables and DI Benefit

Awards Association

Variable

r2

—

Inter -party

Competition
Voting turnout

10^0

Interest groups
Total

It

14

is not

%

really surprising that voting turnout

should prove to be the most suggestive variable.

It

is

less

remote than the other input characteristics in indicating

a

potential direct influence upon the variance in the percentages of benefit awards among the states.

represents

a

Voting turnout

more direct measure of the participation of

citizens and their predisposition to express their wants
and needs through the input channels into the political
system.

Although the three input variables together explain
only 14 percent of the irariance in the disability benefit
awards variable, the results still appear to be rather

significant.

In the first place,

it should be noted that

the Disability Insurance program is not a welfare program.
In the latter,

state decision makers actually have

a

primary

role in formulating policy and establishing the rules and
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regulations for the program.

In the disability program,

federal governmental officials are responsible for
making
the rules and overseeing the administration of the
program

by the state DDU

s.

Therefore, in this type of situation,

there can be no hypothesis of direct cause and effect relation

ships between any of the input variables and the variance in

levels of disability insurance benefit awards.

One can expect

only that these independent variables will have an indirect

association with the dependent variable, and that they will
provide "climates" which may be conducive to vrarying levels
of disability benefit awards to claimants.
It

seems fair to conclude that the percentages of the

variance explained by two of the three input variables tends
to indicate that

are correct.
a

the hypotheses presented in this chapter

The input characteristics help to account for

significant percentage of the variance in the disability

variable which was not explained by the socio-economic
characteristics.

Furthermore, the results give greater

credence to the hypothesis that the states do have
stantial role to play in the determination of the

administration of this federal program.

a

sub-

m.ode of

The follov\ring

chapter, which will include a discussion of the impact of

political system characteristics upon the variance in the

percentages of disability benefit awards among the states,
w^ill

afford a greater opportunity to ascertain the role of

the states in

a

completely federal program and thus to pro-

110

vide a better understanding of the reality of federalism
in practice in the United States.

.

CHAPTER

VI

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND DISABILITY

AWARD VARIABILITY
General System Characteristics
and Award Variability
In the preceding four chapters,

the analysis has

centered upon either the environmental conditions or input
factors which were considered likely to have an effect on
the operation of the Disability Insurance program in the

states.
tion of

In this chapter the focus shifts to a considera-

role of the state political systems in general

liio

and the DDU

'

s

within the state administrative structure in

particular in explaining the variance in the percentage of
benefit awards to claimants.

As noted in Chapter III,

the

DDU’s perform the function of implementing the Disability

Insurance program on the state level and making the actual

decisions about who will receive awards of disability

benefits
In the discussion of the systems model

in Chapter I,

the analysis pointed out that the key decisions concerning
the "allocation of values" for a society are made by actors

within the political system.

Their actions are conditioned

by the environirients within which they operate and by the

inputs emerging from the environments into the political

ill

s
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system.

Responses to the multitude of demands made upon the

political system decision-makers are made within the context
of the limited resources available.

The principal task of

this chapter will be to examine the effects of actions by

decision-makers within the DDU
as explanatory variables,

'

s

in regard to their impact

,

on the variance in the levels of

awards and denials of disability insurance benefits to

claimants.

This analysis

w^ill

be prefaced, however, by a

discussion of specific characteristics of three general political system institutions- -the legislature, executive, and

administ rat ive - -which might have
to the variance

a

predictive relationship

in the dependent variable.

As with the input

variables discussed in the previous chapter, only

a

"neutral

relationship" can be hypothesized to exist between the
political system variables and the variance in the percentage
of disability benefit awards in the states.

Again, the nature

of the Disability Insurance program precludes any reasonable

assumption that general political system characteristics can
determine

a

specific level of percentage of disability bene-

fit awards, since the states do not play an active role in

the program as they do in the multifarious welfare programs.

However, in

tlie

discussion of the impact of the state DDU

administrators on the dependent variable, reasons for specific
levels in the award percentages among the states will be

suggested.

In this case,

the relationship between the DDU

and the disability insurance benefit award variability is

'

.
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direct, and speculation about cause and effect associations
in terms of specific directions of movement between
the two

sets of variables is pertinent.

The discussion in Chapter II and III showed that the

states participate in

which insures them

a

a

system of cooperative federalism

fundamental role in the formulation and

implementation of public policy.

Analysis of the research

of scholars such as Morton Grodzins and Daniel Elazar

indicated that at the center of the relationships of the
state and federal political systems is the notion of "negotiated coordination" or the principle of bargaining in order to

arrive at

a

particular policy acceptable to both federal and

state political system actors.

The history of the develop-

ment of the social security programs in general and the Dis-

ability Insurance program in particular has illustrated this

relationship by showing the ability of the states to acquire
basic decision-making roles in the implementation of the

particular programs, especially Disability Insurance.

The

analysis of the explanatory impact of the socio - economic and
input variables on the variance in the percentages of dis-

ability awards among the states has given even greater
credence to the conclusions of Elazar and others that the
states in fact continue to exert

a

major influence on both

the formulation and implementation of federal and state

polici es

Therefore, it is appropriate now to consider what

,
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characteristics of the state political system institutions
might be most useful as explanatory variables of the variance in the disability insurance benefit awards among the
states.

It

is

suggested here that the relevant quality,

possessed to some degree by the legislatures, executives,
and administrative institutions of all of the state political

systems, is professionalism.

Thus three political system

variables may be labelled variously as legislative professionalism, gubernatorial professionalism (effectiveness)
and administrative professionalism.

It

may be argued further

that a fourth variable, political innovation, is germane

here, and it shall be used as

a

further indication of the

professional quality of state political systems.
Legislative professionalism was developed as

a

vari-

able in the analysis of comparative state legislatures by

John

G.

Grumm.

He explicated this category by the use of

the following attributes: members and committees well -staffed

informational services available when needed; legislators
well-paid, work full-time, and regard their roles as pro-

fessional.^

Neither with this variable nor with any of the

other three professional political system variables discussed

below is tliere any suggestion of

a

direct cause and effect

^John G. Grumm, "The Effects of 'Legislative Structure
on Legislative Performance," in Richard Hofferbert and Ira^
Sharkansky, State and Urban Politics: Readings in Comparative
Public PolicyT^sTbn Little, Brown, and Co., 1971)”, ^pp.
2’98-3’22, esp”^ p. 509; and The Citizens Conference on State
Legislatures, State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their
Effectiveness iNew York: Praeg'er Publishers, 1971).
:

;
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relationship between the independent variables and the

variance in the percentage of awards of disability benefits
among the states.

It

is

hypothesized only that there will

be an association between each of the independent variables

and the dependent variable strong enough to indicate that
the former serve an explanatory function in regard to the

variance in the dependent disability award benefit variable.
Therefore, in the case of the legislative professionalism

variable, it is hypothesized (see Hypothesis Seven-a on page
4,

Chapter

I)

that professionalism in the legislative insti-

tutions of the state political systems will account for some
of the variance in the disability awards among the states.

Gubernatorial effectiveness, the second political
system variable selected for this study, was formulated by

Joseph Schlesinger in order to determine the relative position of the governors in their administrative -pol it ical

relationships with the other major institutions of the state

political systems.

Schlesinger measured various aspects of

the formal powers of the governor, such as tenure potential,

appointive powers, budget powers, and veto powers.

2

These

various aspects of the governor’s power indicate the degree
of effectiveness that he possesses in his relationships with
the administrative and legislative institutions with which

^Joseph Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive,"
210-237; and Thad Beyle and J. Oliver
in Jacob and Vines, pp
Williams, 1 h e America n Go verno r in BehaviOi'al Perspective
(New York: liarper and Row, 1972).
.
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he must deal.

In regard to this study,

it

is

hypothesized

(see Hypothesis Seven-b on page 4, Chapter

I)

that guberna-

torial effectiveness will be correlated with variance in

disability benefit award levels among the states and will thus
act as an indirect determinant of variability in award rates.

Administrative professionalism, the third political
system variable, has been operationalized by Ira Sharkansky.
He has designed a measurement for administrative profession-

alism within state administrative organizations.

Sharkansky

argues that the quality of professionalism is attributable
to administrators who have had "advanced training in their

fields of specialization," who have "an active concern to
stay abreast of the latest developments," and who have

a

"desire to implement the most advanced level of service available."

3

Since, as Sharkansky argues, no really adequate

measurements for administrative professionalism exist presently, salaries of top personnel in the administrative organi-

zation and average salaries and fringe benefits for all state

employees were used as indicators of professionalism among
state administrators.

4

Applying the notion of administrative professionalism
to the present study,

Seven-c on page

S,

one may hypothesize (see Hypothesis

Chapter

I)

that the professional quality

of state administrative structures will have an explanatory

^Ira Sharkansky, "State Administrators in the Political
Process," in Jacob and Vines, p. 261.
"^Ibid.

.

p

.

262

.
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impact on the variance in the percentages of disability

benefit awards among the states.

One might even suggest

that there should be a greater closeness of association

between the two variables than could be expected from the
legislative professionalism and gubernatorial effectiveness
variables.

The Disability Determination Units

(DDU's)

are

of course a part of the state administrative organization

and therefore are presumably more sensitive to attributes
of the administrative part of the state political system.
The fourth and last of the general political system

variables is political innovation.

This particular variable

was developed by Jack Walker, who sought to measure the

"relative speed with whicli states adopt new programs."^
Hence, Walker has focused upon the length of time that it
takes states to adopt programs which have been established

either at the federal level or by one of the state governments.

Although not identical with any of the professionalism

indices discussed above, it is fair to assume that there is
a

close affinity between states with high scores on these

measures of professionalism and those states which are more
innovative in adopting new programs.

Therefore, one may

hypothesize (see Hypothesis Seven-d, on page

5,

Chapter

I)

that political innovation will act in analogous fashion to
the other professionalism indices as an explanatory factor

Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation among
the American States," A merican Political Science Review
63 (September, 1969), p. 881
^Jack

L,

,
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of the variance of disability benefit awards among
the states.

With these hypotheses in mind, it is possible now
to proceed to a summary of the results of the
statistical

analysis.

Table

6

indicates that the political system

variables relating to the general professional stature of
the state governmental institutions were quite fruitful in

accounting for variance in the levels of disability benefit
awards among the states.

As shown in the Table below, ad-

ministrative professionalism proved to be the most significant variable, explaining 16 percent of the variance in the

benefit awards variable.

This variable was followed by the

gubernatorial effectiveness and political innovation indices,

which accounted for

7

percent and

6

percent respectively of

the variance in the dependent variable.

Table

6

Political System Variables and
DI Benefit Aivards Association

Variable

Administrative
Professionalism

16 %

Gubernatorial
Effectiveness

1 %

Innovation

6%

Legislative
Professionalism

—

Total

29 %
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The legislative professionalism measure did not

report a statistically significant correlation.

It

is

interesting to note that the two institutions closest to
the operation of the DDU

’

s

represented by the administrative

professionalism and guvernator ial effectiveness variables,
accounted for the bulk of the variance explained by these

political system characteristics.

Furthermore,

strong coefficient of determination (R

)

a

moderately

of 29 percent clearly

points to the existence of other factors than socio-economic

characteristics in explaining the variance of disability
insurance benefit awards among the states.

Although the

input variables discussed in Chapter V hinted at this con-

clusion, the political system characteristics discussed in
this section of the present chapter have added substantial

evidence in support of this view.
The results of the statistical analysis presented

here do allow one to conclude tentatively that certain
state political system characteristics do indeed account for
some of the variance in the levels of disability award
rates.

However, more conclusive evidence for the correct-

ness of the hypothesis can only be obtained by examining the

decision-making process
Units themselves.

\\rithin

the Disability Determining

Since it is v/ithin these state agencies

that the actual decisions about whether or not to allow

a

claimant disability benefits are made, one would expect that
the m.cst useful explanatory determinants of the variance in
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benefit award percentages among the states would be found
there.

Ascertaining the validity of this hypothesis will be

the task of the next section of this chapter.

The DDU s and PI Benefit Aw ards
among the States
*

Having examined the impact of selected socio-economic,
input, and political system variables upon the variability
in the benefit award rates among the states,

it is now appro-

priate to consider the role of the Disability Determining
Units themselves in accounting for the variance among the
states in the implementation of the program.

administrators in the DDU

’

s

Since the

are the key decision-makers in

the initial and reconsideration stages of the disability

determination process, it is likely that their attitudes
and actions will have

a

major effect upon the variance in

the levels of awards and denials among the states.

Although

the quas i - independent action of the administrators implied

by this hypothesis runs contrary to the established goals of
the Disability Insurance program, evidence from the previous

analysis of the explanatory impact of environmental, input,
and general political system characteristics points to the

actions of DDU examiners and directors as further explanations for the variability in the disability program among
the states.

The information, upon which the following analysis
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is based, was obtained through a series of
interviews at

six state DDU offices and three federal regional
disability

insurance offices.

State DDU directors, supervisors, and

whenever possible examiners themselves, were interviewed in
the state agencies.

In each of the Regional offices,

the

representative of the Social Security Administration in charge
of the Disability Insurance program in
of the country was interviewed.

a

particular region

Interviews took place at

the DDU’s in Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, Wisconsin,

Oakland

(a

sub-state regional office of the California state

DDU), and Louisiana.

The regional representatives were

interviewed in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco and Baton
Rouge.

^

Although these interviews actually constitute

a

series of case studies from which any generalizations must
be tentative, care has been taken in selecting states not

only in various regions of the country, but also with signi-

ficant variations in the ratios of awards to denials of

disability benefits.
In order to determine the extent to which the atti-

tude and actions of disability examiners, supervisors, or

DDU directors have an impact upon the variance in the levels
of av/ards and denials in the disability program, it is neces^The Dallas Regional Representative was present
during the interviews with the DDU administrators in Baton
The interviews with the DDU officials and the regional
Rouge.
representatives v;ere conducted by Professor Irving Howards of
the Dcpartnient of Political Science of the University of
This writer w'as present at all of the interMassachusetts.
views within the New England area.

-
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sary to examine in some detail the actual disability
determin-

ation process as it occurs in each of the DDU

'

s

.

Through

this examination it is hoped that factors pointing to sub-

jectivity in decision-making by state DDU administrators
will be revealed.

This process of disability evaluation is

referred to here as the "sequential analysis" and consists
of

a

series of stages of decision-making in which disability

claimants are judged as to their eligibility for benefits.
The sequential analysis moves from cases of clear-cut

disability toward those in which more judgment on the part
of examiners is needed.

As Robert Dixon explains, "the

tests are successive in the sense that they set forth a

progression from ’hardcore' disability to ’borderline'
disability, and
deny

a

a

determiner cannot reach

a

conclusion to

claim until he has considered all the tests." 7
The first stage of the sequential analysis consists

of an objective medical determination of the purported dis-

ability of the claimant.

Examiners rely upon the physician’s

diagnosis of the physical or mental impairment of the claimant.

Thereupon,

tliey

consult the Handbook for Physicians

g

in order to determine whether a claimant’s disability "fits"

^Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Social Security and Mass
Justice- -A Problem in Welfar e Adjudication (New York;
Praegef TubI isHers 1975X1 P- 54.
,

Department of Health, Education, and Wel-_
fare. Social Security Administration, Disability Evaluation
under Social Security; A Handbook for Physicians (Washing
Fon, D. C.; Co'vernme’nt Printing Office, 1970).
S.
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any of the categories of disability listed in the
schedule
of imnairments

If a claimant's disability is listed in

.

this schedule, then disability benefits are awarded without

inquiring further into the residual work capacity of the

applicant or his potential ability to overcome his disability.
Persons interviewed in the DDU's agreed that this
stage of the sequential analysis is

mination of w'hether

a

a

straightforward deter-

claimant meets the listings in terms

of a specific disability or impairment.

The element of

judgment on the part of the examiners is negligible in these
cases, which constitute approximately ten percent of the

total number of disability insurance claims processed through
the DDU agencies.

The second stage in the sequential analysis centers
on a determination of whether or not a claimant's disability,

failing to meet the listings in the Handbook

,

will neverthe-

less conform to the "spirit" of those disability categories.

This involves

a

judgment as to whether

a

multiple number

of disability impairments of a claimant equal a category

stipulated in the listings.

Although not an area where

great evaluation is called for, the examiners nevertheless
have to decide what an "equivalent" set of disabilities is
and whether or not to consult

a

physician in any particular

case to obtain expert medical advice.

Several DDU adminis-

trators interviewed claimed that only minimal judgments are

made in this category of cases by the examiners.

Some sug-
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gested, however, that the meaning of "equivalent” does in
fact introduce the possibility of varying interpretations.

These people also mentioned the problem of determining the

"residual functional capacity" of the claimant to engage
in "substantial gainful activity," in those cases in which

the particular disability does not automatically place one

under

a

medical listing where benefits are granted immedi-

ately.

Although these two concepts will be discussed in
greater detail in the examination of the third stage of the
sequential analysis, essentially the problem concerns the

determination of the ability of the claimants to perform
jobs that would allow them to earn

a

basic living wage.

Examiners must determine whether or not

disability which, although

a

claimant has

it does not meet

listings prescribed in the Handbook

,

a

the medical

precludes him from

participating in employment sufficient to provide him with
a

minimum wage.
One regional representative admitted that "consider-

able judgment" is required in determining whether the edu-

cational level of

a

claimant is adequate for him to engage

in substantial gainful activity, even in those cases falling
w'ithin this

Further-

second stage of the sequential analysis.

more, an interviewee

i^i

one of the DDU’s stated that this

stage of the decision-making process is "largely judgmental,"

mainly because the meaning of the term "equivalent"

is

judg-
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mental.

This same response was elicited from members
of at

least one other DDU

,

who suggested that the "equal to"

phrasing led to "considerable judgment" on the part of
disability insurance examiners.
Finally, persons interviewed
in some DDU

s

remarked that the problem of determining whether

or not a claimant can perform substantial gainful activity
has become a focus of attention even in this stage of the

decision-making process.
That these concerns should be mentioned in dis-

cussion this stage of the sequential analysis with respondents in the DDU's is somewhat surprising since many other

administrators argued that this aspect of the decisionmaking process is free of any major judgments on the part
of the examiners.

This controversy of opinion in most of the

DDU's where administrators were interviewed suggests that

administrative regulations themselves cannot preclude
administrators from making judgmental decisions where criteria such as "residual functional capacity" and "substantial gainful activity,"

\\rhich

cannot be rigidly defined,

are involved.
The role of the medical consultants in this stage
of the sequential analysis sheds further light upon the

difficult duties of the examiners in this area of decisionmaking.

In at

least one of the DDU's, one of the super-

visors pointed to the problem of the attitude of the medical

consultants to allov;ances of benefits.

This respondent

,

.
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argued that doctors defined disability in terms of their own

private practice and

w'ere not

sufficiently concerned with

specific regulations of the disability program.
a

Furthermore,

medical consultant in one DDU argued that, among doctors,

there are "allowance specialists" and "denial specialists,"
thus indicating the reality of interpretation and judgment

among the physicians themselves in regard to the disabling

effects of particular impairments.

Although the examiners

themselves make the final decisions within the DDU

’

s

varieties of interpretations from the medical consultants
can only add to the amount of judgment already present at
this particular stage in the decision-making analysis.

The evidence of subjective judgment in this strictly

medical phase of disability determination process encourages
one to proceed to the third stage of the sequential analysis.

Claimants who are not able to meet the listings directly or

through equivalent impairments, but who nevertheless have

a

"moderately severe" disability fall within this category,

which consists of 60 to 70 percent of the cases.

Although

the principal criterion for evaluating the eligibility of

the applicant's claim remains the severity of the disability,
the examiner cannot rely upon the listings in the Handbook
or

a

judgment that multiple impairments are equivalent to

particular category in the listings.

a

Rather, the concepts

of "residual functional capacity" and "substantial functional

activity" mentioned above play major roles as criteria for

evaluation
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Unfortunately, the central notion of "substantial
gainful activity

has a history of definitional ambiguity

and this is reflected in the diverse interpretations of this

concept by the DDU state administrators.

A short digression

to outline the principal areas of controversy will therefore

be appropriate.

The ability to engage in substantial gain-

ful activity was originally intended to assist disability

examiners in determining whether or not claimants' impairments were severe enough to be considered eligible for

disability insurance.

Although the Handbook for Physicians

was also available to assist examiners, the percentage of the

cases falling within the first two stages of the sequential

analysis was continually under 30 percent of the total

Substantial gainful activity (SGA) required not

number.

only that

claimant's medical impairment prevent him from

a

working in his previous job, but also that it prevent him
from performing satisfactorily in other types of employment.
Thus, persons who were able to acquire other skills or

persons who were unemployed simply because of the socio-

economic conditions in their residential areas and not

because of

a

physical or mental impairment were precluded

from receiving disability benefits.
In the early 1960s,

however, the courts reviewing

appeals of claimants who were denied disability benefits

became dissatisfied with the precision of the definition of
SGA.
V.

In 1960,

Judge Friendly declared in the case of Kerner

Flemming that disability determination "requires resolu-

,
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tion of two issues- -(1) what can applicant do, and

employment opportunities are there for
what applicant can do.

a

(2)

what

man who can do only

Mere theoretical ability to engage

in substantial gainful activity is not enough if no reason-

able opportunity for this is available."^

Thereafter, greater

emphasis was placed on the types of jobs in the economy

which the claimant could perform in the reports of disability determining examiners.

This did not include, however,

reference to specific jobs in the economy that were available
at the particular time for the claimant.

As a corrolary to this problem, the issue of the

geographical area in which employment opportunities had to
be available arose.

Butler

Flemming

V.

,

In 1961,

for example,

in the case of

the court ruled that employment should

be available within the "general area where the claimant
lives.

The issue was supposedly resolved in the 1967

Congressional amendments to the Social Security Act, in

which it is stated that

a

claimant can be considered dis-

abled
Only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable
to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any
9

1960)
Kerner V. Flemming, 283 P. 2d 916 (2d Cir.
quoted in Staff Report of Committee on Ways and Means of
"
House of Representatives on 'The Disability Insurthe U.
ance Pr•og ram" (Washington: U. S. Go vernment Pr i:nt ing Of f ice
1

,

,

c;

1974)

,

PP
10

.

46-4 7

.

Flemming, 288
quoted in SfaTT Report, p. 49.

Butler

V.

F.

2d 591

(5 th

Cir

.

,

1961)

.

.

129

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the
national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, ’or
whether he would be hired if he applied to work.H

Although this is

a

fairly tight definition of SGA, the quali-

fiers of age, education, and previous work experience do

leave room for interpretation by the state disability

examiners.

Furthermore, it allows the state administrators

to use their judgment in determining whether or not a claim-

ant has sufficient "residual functional capacity" to perform
in certain types of employment.

As was pointed out in the

discussion of the second stage of the sequential analysis,
these particular criteria necessarily require the examiner
to make judgments

about awards or denials even in those cases

where medical criteria are presumably the principal

determinants
It

is

in the third stage of the decision-making

process, however, that evidence is most readily available to

illustrate the impact that disability examiners may have
upon the variability in the percentages of disability insurance awards among the states.

Administrators interviewed

generally admitted that residual skills of the claimant,
his age, and educational background constitute the principal

criteria in determining whether or not

a

person applying for

disability benefits can engage in substantial gainful
activity
^^Staff Report, p. 49.
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In the process of determining the residual
functional

capacity of

a

claimant, the state DDU agencies vary consider-

ably in their use of vocational rehabilitation
facilities

which might provide valuable consultations in particular
cases.

In one state,

for example, the DDU has a full-time

vocational expert who is able to assist the disability
adjudicator.

Moreover, difficult decisions in regard to

determining residual functional capacity are sent to

Vocational Evaluation Center

(a

a

private, non-governmental

agency) where a claimant can be evaluated on the basis of

tasks that he is able to perform.

In one other state,

on the

other hand, the DDU administrators make their own decisions

solely on the basis of their own judgment of the merits of
the cases.

Speaking of the state DDU

'

within his juris-

s

diction, one regional representative stated that there are
real problems with the notions of "significant impairment"

and "residual functional capacity," and that some state DDU

agencies allow under almost any circumstances, regardless of
the abilities of the claimants.

Although residual functional capacity does have an
important role in the determination of

a

claimant's eligi-

bility for benefits, the principal criterion in this third
stage of the sequential analysis remains the ability of an

applicant to engage in substantial gainful activity.

The

attempt of the Congress in the 1967 Amendments to the
Social Security Act to give

a

final precise definition to
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this concept has apparently not succeeded.

There was

a

consensus among the DDU administrators interviewed that
the
attempt to use the national economy as

a

standard for the

determination of the availability of substantial gainful
work has not proved successful.

Nearly all of them agreed

that this particular rule is simply not realistic and con-

sequently, is not followed in making decisions.

A director

of a DDU noted that the national economy standard is of
"no consequence" and that only opportunities for employment
in the immediate region are relevant to the DDU decision-

makers in his state.

One regional representative went even

further than this and contended that the "area of the state

where the applicant resides" is the appropriate geographic
area to consider in determining the availability of sub-

stantial gainful employment for

a

claimant.

There were exceptions to this lenient attitude,
however, as in the case of one DDU director, who apparently

decided to interpret the statute literally and thus insisted
upon denying claimants' benefits if substantial gainful

activity for which they are suited

is

available in their

region or in the national economy in general.

He argued that

the disability program is essentially an insurance program

and not simply

a

"social welfare" type program.

Interviews

in another DDU elicited a difference of opinion among two of

the administrators on this issue.

One insisted upon using

the "national economy" standard and denying claims to those
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persons for whom jobs are available somewhere in the country,
while the other argued that "concern about his state" dictated

a

policy in which the conditions in the claimant's

own state would be taken into consideration.

This difference

of opinion among administrators interviewed suggests that the

state agencies have the opportunities to transform the rules
and regulations of the disability program when they do not

consider them to be applicable in

a

"realistic" way to the

facts of the situation in their own states.

1

?

Regardless of the geographic area involved, the dis-

ability examiners must still decide whether there

is

sub-

stantial gainful work available which the claimant can perform.

To assist the examiner,

the Directory of Occupational

Titles (DOT), which lists the types of jobs theoretically

present in

a

particular state or region, is available for

the adjudicator's use.

Opinions of the respondents differ,

however, on the usefulness of the DOT as

a

realistic indica-

tor of the availability of substantial gainful work in

a

particular region, and on its proper place among the criteria
for determining whether claimants should receive disability

insurance.

The varying attitudes of the administrators

interviewed on

tliis

subject can be illustrated by discussing

the views of two DDU administrators in the same agency.

One

^^For a comprehensive study of the problem of
administrative discretion in regard to rules and regulations, cf. Henry J. Friendly, T he Federal Administrative
A gen cies (Cambridge, Mass.: Flarvard University Press, 1962).
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examiner insisted that, although the "national economy"
standard is being ignored, the DOT manual is followed very

closely in determining whether there are jobs available

which

a

claimant with

a

particular level of residual function

al capacity can perform.

included jobs which

a

He explained that if the listings

claimant can theoretically perform,

then this constituted proof that opportunities for SGA
are available.

This particular perspective was echoed in

other DDU agencies, but wide variance among the states in
levels of awards and denials and the fact that such socio-

economic variables as employment status and ethnicity account
for a portion of the variance in the dependent variable,

lead one to question the accuracy of this view.

An interview with

a

supervisor in that same agency

elicited the conclusion from the respondent that there

is

"extreme discretionary power" in the hands of the examiners.
He stressed that he instructs his examiners to ascertain the

feasibility of
competition

a

witli

disability claimant obtaining
a

non-disabled person.

a

job in

Furthermore, he

stated that examiners have to empathize with the employers
doing

tlie

hiring of disabled persons and try to determine

the realistic prospects of the claimant being hired.

This

supervisor felt that benefits should be given in borderline
situations, because the job of the examiner is to serve the

claimant while still working within the framew'ork of rules
and regulations of the program.

As this supervisor phrased
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it:

"Is it really feasible for this person

(i.e., a disability

insurance claimant) to compete with an average person
applying
for a job?"

His answer was that it is probably not reason-

able and therefore

a

certain amount of flexibility is needed.

This type of attitude is also discerned in the res-

ponses of

a

number of other administrators interviewed.

Director of one DDU

,

for example, emphasized the importance

of transferrable skills in a "practical" sense,

reasonableness of

a

The

particular person (of

i.e., the

particular age,

educational background, etc.) finding another lob, given
the types of employment opportunities available.

One region-

al representative noted the example of a claimant with a

"significant impairment" who was 55 years of age with six
years of education, and not able to transfer his skills.

He

stated that this type of claimant would receive benefits,
even though there might be "theoretical" jobs listed in the
DOT

vv'hich

the claimant could perform.

This latitude in interpreting the statutes pre-

scribing the rules and regulations for the implementation
of the program was certainly not the intention of the legis-

lators.

It

is clear from the preceding discussion that

strict guidelines do not preclude the state DDU administrators
from allowing their own subjective judgments to dictate the

operative standards that will be utilized in determining the

eligibility of claimants to disability benefits, especially
in the third stage of the sequential analysis where medical

.

.
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considerations are not the only principal criteria.

These

findings, however, do support the principal hypothesis of
this thesis, that the states, and in particular the state

political systems, do play an active role in guiding the

implementation of this totally federally funded program,
even if this means giving personal interpretation to
some of the regulations to make them conform to what, in the

judgment of individual DDU administrators, is the most

practical solution to problem areas within their respective
states
The search for reasons to explain this variability
in the administrative implementation of the Disability Insur-

ance program is not exhausted by demonstrating the flexi-

bility of regulations as applied by the examiners.

This

situation merely sets the context in which other causal
factors, more directly related to the state DDU administrators, may operate.

As stated in the hypotheses at the

beginning of the thesis (see Hypothesis Seven-e on page
Chapter I), it

is

5,

epxected that the degree of professional-

ism of the administrators in the state DDU

'

s

will partially

explain the variability in the percentage of benefit award
In this particular case, profes-

rates among the states.

sionalism was further analyzed into factors such as background
and qualification of examiners and length of service of

examiners within the DDU

'

s

The DDU director himself determines the method of
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recruitment for examiners in each of the states.

Qualifica-

tions required of new examiners vary from state to state.
In one DDU

,

for example,

examiners must have earned

a

B.

A.

degree and have three to five years of experience in related
fields.

Respondents indicated that only

a

"few" of the

examiners are selected from civil service lists, i.e., by
way of the merit system.

Newspaper ads and unemployment

security offices seem to be the principal means of recruiting
new examiners in this particular state. One supervisor in
this particular DDU indicated that his examiners were largely

teachers, clergymen, and social workers.

Another DDU director indicated that common sense
experience of "learning from the world of experience" was
much more important than formal education for this particular
type of job that examiners perform.

Although the required

experience in his agency at one time was

a B.

A.

degree and

two years of experience, presently it consists of possessing
a

high school diploma and six years of experience, two of

which are in the DDU itself.

The director noted that in

this manner clerical staff can be appointed to positions of

examiners if they are qualified.
At the other extreme of the spectrum is at least one

DDU, where examiners must have earned not only a B. A.

degree in behavioral or related science, but also must attain
a M.

A.

degree within three years of their appointment.

Furthermore, this DDU operates completely within the state
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merit system, and all of its selections are approved by
the State Department of Education, the controlling unit of
the DDU.

Finally, in the Mid-West, only one state requires
that administrators possess an M. A. degree, and then only
in the case of supervisors of examiners.

there exists

a

In one instance,

"career candidate entry system" through

which candidates with qualifications for potential jobs
examiners are selected.

as

The criteria for screening candi-

dates, however, are stipulated by the director of the DDU.

This state by state fluctuation in the manner of

selection and in the prescribed qualifications for new
examiners may account for some of the variation among the
states in the percentages of disability insurance benefit
awards.

It

is

interesting to note in this regard that

disability award levels for three states show an inverse
relationship to the level of professionalism of the DDU
examiners, determined on the basis of their manner of selection and qualifications at the time of hiring.

One state,

with comparatively low educational standards for examiners,
has the highest allowance rate of the three states, whereas

another, with the strictest qualifications has the lowest

award rates.

The third state is in the middle both in

terms of award levels and the level of qualifications for

new examiners.

Together

v;ith the

variables of qualifications and
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means of selection of examiners, the length of experience
of the typical examiner in

a

DDU may be an important causal

factor in exp laining the variance in dis ab i 1 i
ty award rates
among the states.

For example, the director of one DDU

stated that his staff consisted primarily of "trainees,"
that he had no "trained" adjudicators and had not had any
in the past.
a

This rather ameteurish operation may well be

reason for the comparatively high percentage of disability

awards given in this state.

Likewise, in another state

with high disablity award rates, examiners were said to be
"mostly inexperienced," i.e., with one year or less of

experience in the DDU.

(Qualifications for examiners in this

particular state consist of having
practical experience necessary.)

degree, with no

A.

a B.

One regional representative

suggested that states vary in award rates in part because of
the length of experience of examiners in the DDU

'

s

.

He

noted that about 60 percent of the examiners in his region
have less than one year of experience on the job and argued
that this is likely to influence the kinds of determinations

rendered by examiners.
The age and social attitudes of examiners are further

factors which may have

a

bearing on the kinds of judgments

made by disability examiners in the DDU

'

s

.

One DDU adminis-

trator suggested that many of the younger examiners are more
aivare

of such phenomena as the "black liberation movement"

and the problems of "poverty" and are therefore more likely

.
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to be quite liberal
to claimants.

in decisions to allow disability benefits

One of the examiners in another DDU admitted

taking into account questions of ethnicity and race when

determining whether

a

claimant with

a

"significant impairment"

can perform substantial gainful activity.

Although all of these responses of administrators
interviewed concerning the qualifications, experience, and
attitudes of disability insurance examiners are fragmentary
at best,

they do afford one the opportunity to see the

importance of the DDU administrator in the actual implementation of the Disability Insurance program.

The state DDU

agencies do differ in the degree of professionalization of
their operations, and it is reasonable to conclude that this

variability accounts for some of the differences in the percentages of disability insurance benefit awards among the
states
The bulk of the above analysis of the role of the

DDU's in the administrative implementation of the program
has centered on the decision-making process, and on the impor-

tance of the examiners in determining the types of decisions

made in terms of awards and denials of disability benefits.
It

is

appropriate now, however, to set this analysis in the

context of

a

discussion of the DDU's within the

administrative structure in which they function.

f ederal

-

state

Because of

the manner of the implementation of the Disability Insurance

program, the DDU's find themselves in

a

rather ambiguous
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position, administering

within

a

a

federal program but situated

state administrative structure.

Although,

as

one

regional representative emphasized, the federal offices

"maintain their interest in every conceivable way," there is
a

necessary element of negotiation since "appropriate super-

vision" over the DDU's must be tempered with sensitivity to
the viewpoint of the states.

He commented further that

the "states are not our branch offices" and that the adminis-

trative arrangements between the federal and state agencies
"is an awkward system."

This "awkward system" is of course

in actuality the phenomenon of cooperative federalism and

the following problem areas will be discussed in this context.

The most significant points of controversy in regard
to the position of the DDU's are those of personnel and

budgetary policy in the agencies and relationships between
the DDU’s and the vocational rehabilitation offices to which
the former are normally subordinated in the state adminis-

The principal problem areas of personnel

trative structures.

policy are those of the number, salaries, and classification
status of persons working in the DDU's.

Each aspect of this

particular area of policy manifests the active role of the
states in the im.plementat ion of

a

federal policy within

a

cooperative federal system.
The maintenance of or increase in the number of per-

sonnel in a DDU is

a

function of the need to stabilize or to

expand the program in the states in order to provide adequate
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services to claimants.

The policy decisions in terms of new

personnel are made by the federal authorities; but, because
the DDU

'

function within state administrative networks, the

s

state legislatures and executives must approve any proposals
for new personnel.
the DDU

'

s

,

According to persons interviewed within

the states do not automatically assent to the

wishes of the federal or DDU administrators.

Decisions to

contravene the plans of the federal Bureau of Disability
Insurance (BDI) or

a

regional office to expand the program

in a particular state are made,
to be incurred by the states,

federally funded.

even though no costs were

since the program is completely

One DDU director, for example, noted that

his state vetoed the authorization by the regional office of
an administrative assistant, determining that it was an

unnecessary addition of personnel.

Administrators in

another DDU stated that the major problems they encountered
in their relations with the state governments were precisely

in this area of the acquisition of new personnel and replace-

ment of retired personnel.

A DDU director remarked that

the "political climate" of a state can influence the atti-

tudes of legislators and governors in instituting personnel

ceilings which will affect the size of the DI program in

a

particular state.
Two other aspects of personnel policy include
the DDU's,
salaries and classification status of personnel in

pronounced,
Here the presence of the states is even more
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since the federal administrators have virtually
no voice in
these kinds of decisions.
Opinions among the administrators

interviewed differed over the extent of the problems in
this area.

'

Some claimed that they were non-existent, and

others complained that, although they were part of

a

federal

program, their salaries and classification status were

completely determined by the states and that as

a

consequence

they were not equal to their federal counterparts.

Closely associated with the problems of personnel

policy are those of budgetary policy.

Here again, one finds

a

situation in which the federal authorities may propose

a

level of spending in the DDU

'

s

,

but in which the states

have an opportunity to decide whether or not to approve the
requests.

States which have instituted "austerity” measures

may include budgetary items of the DDU’s within their

attempts to control spending.
of the DDU

'

s

,

In terms of the operations

the states can control the salaries of the

personnel, the total amount of money available for salaries
(thus determining the number of personnel that a DDU will

have at any particular time)

,

and also funds available for

equipment and other expenditures essential to the operation
of the DDU’s.

Furthermore, budgetary procedures must be

followed according to state regulations, such as "line-item"
budgeting; thus
so chooses,

a

state may delete

a

particular item if it

even though it does not have to appropriate any

of the funds for the DDU budget.
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One of the potentially most controversial aspects
of the relationships of the DDU

’

with the states concerns

s

the former’s relationships with the Vocational Rehabilitation

agencies to which they are normally subordinated in the
state administrative structure.

Complaints from those

administrators interviewed focus upon the faulty understandings
of vocational rehabilitation people concerning the purposes

and regulations of the Disability Insurance program.

One

DDU director, for example, stated that his office is "buried"

under state agencies and people who do not understand the

responsibilities of the DDU.

He noted that his agency is

subordinated to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation,
the Department of Social and Rc-habilitation Services, and the

Human Services Agency.

In another case,

organization is such that the DDU

is

the administrative

subordinated to the

Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, which in turn is part
of the State Department of Education.

As the director of

this DDU explained, the Vocational Rehabilitation office is

"so much larger than the DDU, they are overwhelmed," and

furthermore the vocational rehabilitation people do not understand the mission of the DDU.

In the opinion of this DDU

director, his agency is considered

a

"step child" under the

control of the parent state agency.
These areas of controversy, emanating from the fact
that the DDU

'

s

are situated within state administrative

structures, tend to support the previous analysis concerning

.
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the role of the DDU examiners in explaining variance
in the

percentage of disability benefit awards to claimants.

The

individual states do have opportunities to affect the mode
of operation of the Disability Insurance program within their
j

ur isdict ions

Summary
The discussion in this chapter has demonstrated the

fruitfulness of the systems framework as an analytical model
at an important juncture in the analysis,

i.e.,

in deter-

mining the impact of the general political system institutions and the role of the DDU administrators on the vari-

ability in the percentage of disability benefit awards
among the states.

Following the conclusions of others that

notions such as "partnership" and "negotiated coordination"

were descriptive of the relationships between state and
federal political systems in implementing public policies,
it seemed appropriate to hypothesize that state political

systems would exert an influence upon the disability awards

dependent variable.

It was

suggested that the most relevant

quality in each of the major political institutions discussed
here,

legislative, executive, and administrative, seemed to

be professionalism.

Political innovation was added as

a

fourth variable, another indicator of professionalism in
state political systems.
The analysis indicated that these general political

145

system variables were quire useful in accounting for variance
in the levels of disability benefit awards among the
states.

The total variance explained by these variables was 29 percent, with administrative professionalism alone accounting
for 16 percent of this variance.

natorial effectiveness
(6

percent)

.

(7

It was

followed by guber-

percent) and political innovation

The legislative professionalism variable did

not prove to be statistically significant.

These results

showed that professionalism in the administrative and

executive institutions of the state political systems

^

those

nearest the actual operations of the DDU’s,were most significant in explaining the variance in the dependent variable.
The statistical analysis was given substantial

support by the case studies of the operations of several
state Disability Determining Units (DDU’s), by way of inter-

views with DDU personnel and regional representatives of
the federal Bureau of Disability Insurance (BDI)

An

.

analysis of the decision-making process in the DDU

'

s

,

the

so-called "sequential analysis," indicated that legislative
amendments, and administrative rules and regulations do not

preclude state DDU administrators using their own judgment
in deciding disability benefit award cases.

In those

instances where medical factors are not the sole determinant
of an award or denial decision, the DDU examiners do indeed

interpret the regulations and apply them to particular cases.
In order to determine whether a claimant can engage in sub-
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stantial gainful activity, the examiners have
to determine
the "residual functional capacity" of the
claimant, and to

decide, on the basis of the claimant's age,
educational

background, and his previous work experience, whether
or not
he is presently employable.
In this

decision-making process, the statutory and

administrative rules function as

a

context within which the

administrator must operate, but they do not preclude him
from selectively applying the regulations when he thinks that
the situation demands it.
to the Social Security Act,

In regard to the 1967 amendment

indicating explicitly that the

"national economy" was to be the area in which substantial
gainful activity sliould be sought for

a

claimant, many

administrators have simply refused to look beyond their own
states in ascertaining whether or not there is employment

available which

a

claimant could perform.

Directory of Occupational Titles (DOT)

,

Furthermore, the

the guide to the

jobs which are theoretically available in a state, in many

instances has not been used by DDU examiners because it is
not considered a realistic indicator of the availability
of jobs which a claimant could really perform or for which
he would be realistically employable.

When reasons were sought to explain the existence of

these rather flexible operating standards for determining

whether or not claimants would be granted disability benefits,
the major explanatory variable again seemed to be profession-

147

alism.

Moreover, it was discovered that the background and

qualification of examiners and length of service of examiners within the DDU’s varied sufficiently to suggest that

professionalism was directly related to the specific percentages of disability benefit awards in the states.

There

was also some evidence to indicate that age and social

attitudes of the DDU administrators may have an impact upon
the types of decisions made.

Although these findings point

to a situation which clearly differs from the intended mode

of operation of the program, it is nevertheless congruent

with the theoretical formulations of Grodzins and Elazar
on the nature of the federal operation in the United

States.

Tliat

their notions of ’'partnership” and "negotiated

coordination” apply even in this completely federally
funded program is further evident from the discussion of
the relationships of the DDU's with the state political

systems.

In the areas of personnel policy, budgetary

matters, and relationships with the state Vocational

Rehabilitation Agencies, to which the DDU's are usually
subordinated in the state administrative organizations,
the presence of the states as a factor in the mode of

operation of the program was evident.

Thus, the findings

presented in this chapter have tended to confirm and reenforce the conclusions from Chapters II through V, that the

states do play an active role in the American federal system

even in policy areas where their involvement might not be

,

148

initially expected 13
On the problems encountered by federal agencies
in regulating the activities of state adminis t rat ive agencies
cf. Herbert Kaufman, Administrative Fe edback (Was hington
D. C.: The Brookings Institution).

5

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis has been to study the

operation of the Disability Insurance program within the
context of American federalism.

Since this program is com-

pletely federal- funded and one in which the states do not
have a primary role in formulating substantive policy, as
they do in the more typical grant-in-aid programs, this

study has provided an opportunity to investigate the role
of the states in a policy area in which their principal

function is simply the administration of the program, with
the major policy decisions, administrative rules and regula-

tions having been formulated at the federal level.

The

purpose of the disability insurance policy has been to provide insurance benefits to claimants who qualify under the

provisions of the program and, as

a

corollary to this, to

insure that the program is administered in a uniform manner

among the states.

It

was assumed that variance in the

percentages of claimants granted insurance benefits among the
states would be minimal and be related only to wdiether or
not they met the explicit standards of the program in regard
to severity of disability and unemployability because of

minimal "residual functional capacity" to engage in "substantive gainful activity."
149

150

An important feature of this program, in terms of
its administrative framework,

is

the fact that state adminis-

trative agencies, the Disability Determining Units (DDU's),
have a key role in its implementation.

It

is

the adminis-

trators within these agencies who make the actual decisions

concerning who will receive disability benefits.

This study

proceeded from the assumption that this arrangement has
resulted in an extension of state influence over the Disability Insurance program far beyond the original intentions
of the policy makers who established this program and, indeed,
in spite of the efforts of federal administrators to main-

tain

a

uniform program.
In order to determine the validity of this assump-

tion, a number of hypotheses were advanced to be tested by

the analysis in Chapters Two through Five.

These hypotheses

included references to the proposed importance of the federal

system in which the states function as semi - autonomous
polities, playing active roles in the formulation and

implementation of most major policies; to the history of
the development of the Social Security programs in general
and to the Disability Insurance program in particular as

illustrations of the impact of the states; to the socio-

economic environments of the state political systems; to
the input and political system characteristics themselves;

and finally to the role of the DDU’s in the implementation
of the Disability Insurance program.

All of these variables
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were considered to be potential factors in pointing to
the
impact of the states on the administration of this particular policy.
In order to present this material in a coherent

manner,

a

suitable analytical framework had to be selected.

After discussing

number of potentially useful models, the

a

systems framework was chosen, since it seemed to be the most
fruitful in terms of comprehensiveness, permitting the above-

mentioned hypotheses to be categorized in terms of environmental, input, and political system characteristics which
might have an impact upon the actual implementation of the
program.

The socio-economic, input, and political system

variables were discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six
respectively.

This analysis was prefaced, however, by two

chapters devoted to

a

discussion of the environmental context

of federalism in theory and in practice, using the develop-

ment of the Disability Insurance program as

a

case-study.

One of the most significant aspects of the political

system in the United States is its federal character,

exemplified in multifaceted negotiated coordination that
constitutes the basic element of any federal political system.
During the past two decades, political scientists have

worked to develop

a

theory of federalism in operation,

moving away from the older, more legalistic perspective
that tended to focus upon the dual nature of the federal and

state political systems.

This either-or conception of levels

.
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of government,

in which the federal and state governments

did not both operate in any single policy area but confined

themselves to different areas of erdeavor, had proven to be

unsatisfactory.

Scholars such as Morton Grodzins and Daniel

Elazar suggested

a

more flexible theory of the operation of

the federal system, one that would take into consideration
the points of contact and the overlapping of functions of

the federal and state political systems.

According to this

theory of overlapping functions, the state and federal political systems undertake few major programs that do not involve

the other as an active partner at least in the formulation

of the policy and usually also in the actual implementation
of the programs

Within this framework one of the major purposes of
research has been that of elucidating the role of the states
in the primarily federal programs and the federal government
in the state programs.

The third chapter of the thesis, on

the development of the Social Security grant-in-aid and

insurance programs in general and the Disability Insurance

program in particular, afforded ample opportunity to illustrate the validity of the hypotheses of Grodzins, Elazar,

and others.

A common denominator in the administration of

most of these programs was the impact of the states in obtaining active roles for themselves in their implementation.

This applied with special effect to the establishment of the

Disability Insurance program in 1957.

Although the federal
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Bureau of Disability Insurance (within the Social Security

Administration) was charged with creating the network of
admin i strative rules and regulations and other enforcement

controls to insure uniformity in the administration of the
program, state administrative agencies (i.e., the Disability

Determining Units) were assigned the duties of making the
actual decisions about who would receive disability benefits.

Viewed through the perspective of the systems
framework, the discussion of the nature of the federal

system and the history of the background of the development
of the Disability Insurance program could serve as a context

within which to insert the analysis of the more immediate
influences on the variance in the implementation of the program among the states.

This federal context is very impor-

tant, however, and it functions as a crucial environmental

influence on the actual operations of the state political
systems.

This became more clear in the analysis of the

impact of the political system, and in particular of the
DDU's, on the variance in the disability program among the
states in Chapter Six.
In Chapters Four through Six,

the analysis followed

closely the systems analytical framework, using its central
categories of "environment,” "inputs," "political system,"
and "outputs" to order the presentation of the findings.

Before proceeding with the analysis of the varying impacts
of the socio-economic,

input, and political system variables,
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however, it became necessary to specify more clearly the
actual content of the dependent variable.

It was defined

as the ratio between the awards and denials of disability

insurance benefits among the states in 1970 or, more
simply, the percentages of benefit awards among the states
for that year.

Given the explicit goals of the Disability Insurance

program and the complex means for review of state DDU's
decisions, it was certainly not evident

a

priori that there

was great variation among the states in the manner of the

implementation of the program.

To be sure, the analysis of

federalism and the history of the development of the disability program had given some indication that this might
well be the case.

However, more specific evidence was needed

to establish that there was

indeed a legitimate output

"variable" existent.
Statistics on the award and denial rates of state
DDU's for 1970 confirmed the assumption about the existence
of wide variance from state to state.

For that year,

according to the figures issued by the Bureau of Disability
,

the ratio of awards to denials varied from

71

percent among the states, with the mean at

Insurance (BDI)
41 percent
52 percent.

to

The accuracy of these statistics was confirmed

by those presented in a Staff Report of the House Committee

which
on Ways and Means on the Disability Insurance Program,

indicated that

for 1970, the range of disability benefit

5
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deni al

was from 28 percent to 60 percent, with the mean at

44.7 percent, thus complementing rather well the statistics

derived from BDI on the variance in the award rates among
the states.

These figures were sufficient to indicate that

variance indeed did exist in the implementation of the disability insurance program among the states.

Following the outline of the systems framework, the
analysis turned first of all to

a

number of socio-economic

environmental variables in order to discover some of the
causes for the discrepancy between the explicit goals of the

program and its actual operation.

Theoretically, it was

assumed, some socio-economic characteristics might be the

primary causal factors in explaining the variance in the
dependent variable.

Variables such as per capita income,

level of industrial development, and level of urbanization

had proven to be fruitful predictors of levels of welfare

expenditures among the states.

In the case of the Disability

Insurance program, however, the peculiar design of the program with its principal criterion of incapacitating dis-

ability had to be used in determining how the specific socio-

economic variables should be categorized in terms of their

relationships to the variance in the percentages of disability benefit awards among the states.

This proved to be

rather complicated since, in the course of the development
of the program, medically determined disability as the principal

criterion had been supplemented by an "equivalent to
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criterion and by such factors as education and work experience
if those prevented a claimant from pursuing "substantial

gainful activity."

These additional criteria suggested the

possibility that benefits might be given occasionally on the
basis of "need," even though

a

disability might not be so

severe as to warrant an allowance decision.

Therefore, in

using socio-economic characteristics as one of the probable

primary causal factors in determining the level of benefit
awards among the states, the purpose was both to determine

whether these types of variables did in fact account for any
variance and further to ascertain what specific characteristics would have the most impact upon the dependent variable
The results of this analysis gave substantial evi-

dence to support the assumption about the active role of the
states in this program.

When the socio-economic character-

istics were correlated with the dependent disability variable
the findings indicated that they explained (statistically)
64 percent of the variance in the levels of disability bene-

fit awards among the states.

Although this was

a

substantial

portion of the variance in the dependent variable, it was

considerably less than one could have legitimately expected,
since the disability program was intentionally designed to

preclude any determinants other than socio-economic factors
from influencing the attempt at
tiie

prograii'i

among the states.

a

uniform administration of

This finding opened up still

further the possibility that other factors, such as "input"
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characteristics, political system characteristics, or the
DDU

'

s

themselves, were having

variance

o-f^

a

decisive impact on the

disability benefit allowances among the states.

Even more important than the specific amount of

variance explained, however, were findings concerning the
types of variables which contributed most to this 64 percent

explanatory variance.

When the variables were classified

according to their expected relationships to the dependent
variable, three main categories were proposed:

(1)

for

variables which should show relationships with the disability
award variable;

(2)

for variables about which there was some

discrepancy in according them "legitimate" status in being

associated with the percentage of awards among the states;
and (3)

for variables which definitely should manifest no

relationships to the dependent variable.
The results of the analysis determined that the major

proportion of the variance explained was contributed by the
third category of socio-economic variables - -migration status,

employment status, income status, and spatial status, those

which should have indicated no relationship with the dependent disability benefit awards variable.

They accounted for

46 percent of the 64 percent of the variance explained by the

socio-economic characteristics.

Migration status and employ-

ment status were most significant, explaining 28 percent and
12 percent of the variance respectively.

These findings

unireduced even further any expectations about discovering
and
formity in the implementation of the disability program
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also about its being administered solely as an
insurance

program rather than, at least in part, as

a

"needs” program

similar to the typical (i.e., before the establishment
of
the SSI programs in 1974) welfare-oriented programs.

Partial confirmation of these conclusions was pre-

sented through the analysis of the variables in the second
category, ethnicity, education, and race, which had an

ambiguous relationship to the dependent variable.

They

contributed 18 percent to the total explained variance, with
ethnicity (10 percent) being the predominant contributor.
It must be remembered that there is a certain ambiguity con-

cerning the legitimacy of the relationships between these

socio-economic characteristics and the variance in the percentages of disability benefit awards.

Even if one were to

grant, Iiow^ever, that they should correlate without question

with the dependent variable, the percentage of the variance
which they explained would not lessen the impact of those
variables in the third category

w’-hich

definitely should not

have had an impact on the aw'arding of allowances, according
to the program design.

The only variable which

w^as

classi-

fied in the first category, median age of the population,

proved ironically to be statistically insignificant.
Follow'ing the systems framework, it was appropriate
to focus next upon the "input" characteristics as potential

explanatory variables.

Since inputs represent demand and

supports being brought into the political system from the
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environment and thus necessitating responses from the

system decision-makers within the limits of the resources
available to them, it was assumed that input characteristics

would have some impact upon the variance of the disability
benefit award rates among the states.

The three input

variables selected for this study were inter-party competition, voting turnout, and interest group strength in the

states.

Together they explained 14 percent of the variance

in the disability award rates, with voting turnout con-

tributing 10 percent and the interest group variable four

percent of the total variance.

The inter-party competition

variable was not statistically significant.

As stated in

the analysis in Chapter V, the predominant impact of the

voting turnout variable was

a

logical outcome, since it is

less rentote than the other two variables in representing

a

direct measure of the participation of citizens and their

predispositions to express their wants and needs through the
input channels into the political system.
The results of the input analysis pointed with

greater sureiiess to the importance of the states in ascertaining the reasons for the wide variance in the disability

allowance levels.

Even though the variance explained by

the input characteristics is relatively small

(14

percent)

and no direct cause and effect associations with the

dependent variable were hypothesized, it seemed appropriate

nevertheless to speak of "climates" provided by the input
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chsractcrist ics which might be conducive to varying levels
of disability benefit awards among the states.

Combined

with the conclusions gleaned from the analysis of socioeconomic variables in Chapter Four, the findings in this
chapter gave greater credence to the hypothesis that the
states do play a substantial role in determining how this

federal program will be administered within their juris-

dictions

.

The sixth chapter of the thesis shifted the analysis
to the state political systems themselves, and to the DDU

'

s

within the state administrative structures in particular,
in order to focus more directly upon those structures which

were deemed likely to have

a

decisive impact upon the vari-

ance in the granting of disability benefit allowances among
the states.

Both the theoretical systems framework and the

conclusions of political scientists on the nature of the

American federal system pointed to the importance of the
political system actors in making those decisions which
"allocate values" for the whole society.
Moreover, the previous analysis in the thesis had

consistently pointed to the possibility of state, and in

particular state-administrative, influence on the implementation of the program.

The second chapter suggested that the

major premise of recent research on the federal system was
that "partnership" and "negotiated coordination" were the

fundamental, essential qualities of American federalism.
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The validity of these conclusions was illustrated in the

historical developmental analysis of the Disability Insurance program, in which it was shown that the states did

indeed have some impact upon the decisions relating to the

formulation and implementation of the program.

The analysis

in Chapter IV was crucial to the evaluation of the primary

hypothesis (i.e., that the states do indeed have an impact
on the implementation of this federal - funded program), since

there was a theoretical possibility that certain socio-

economic characteristics might have "legitimately,” i.e.,

within the framework of the program design, accounted for
all the variance in the benefit allowance rates among the

states.

This did not prove to be the case, however, and those

socio-economic variables which were the most powerful predictors were in fact those which should have had no impact

upon the dependent variable.

Furthermore, this finding

suggested the possibility that the states were making their
impact upon the program by transforming it, in at least some

instances, into

a

"needs" program in which the principal

criterion, medical disability, would be supplemented by

economic need.

The input variable analysis once again

substantiated the assumption of the active role of the states
in the implem.ent ation of the program.
Tlius,

in Chapter Six,

the analysis reached

a

logical

of the
cojicjuding point in its investigation of the role
of the
political system and the DDU's in the implementation
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Disability Insurance program.

In regard to the general

political system discussion, it was hypothesized that

professionalism would be the most pertinent characteristic
of the major political system institutions to indicate their

influence upon the variance in disability benefit allowance
rates among the states.

Measurements of legislative, execu-

tive, and administrative professionalism were used together

with an additional professionalism indicator, political
innovation, to test the hypothesis.

The analysis indicated

these variables were quite fruitful in predicting variance
in the dependent variable.

Together they accounted for

29

percent of the variance in the benefit award percentages,
with administrative professionalism alone explaining 16 percent of this variance.

effectiveness
cent)

,

(7

It was

followed by gubernatorial

percent) and political innovation

(6

per-

with the legislative professionalism variable proving

to be statistically insignificant.

As important as the

percentage of variance explained, however, was the fact
that the most important predictors, administrative pro-

fessionalism and gubernatorial effectiveness, were those
most closely associated with the actual operations of the

DDU's within the state administrative structures.
The analysis of the attitudes and behavior of the

decis ion-mahers within the DDU’s presented the most detailed
and substantial support for the hypothesis concerning the

impact of the states on the implementation of the Disability

.
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Insurance program.

Obviously, in

a

completely federal-

funded program, in which the states do not have

a

primary

policy-making role, the center of state activity in the

program implementation must be located within the state
agencies which perform the specific administrative implementing functions.

Consequently, the DDU’s became

a

primary

focus for attention in order to determine whether or not the

indicators derived from the various sets of statistical

analyses would indeed prove to be accurate, that indeed the
state decision-makers were exerting an important influence

over the administration of the program.

Previous discussion

had indicated that uniformity in program implementation was

only a goal and not an operational reality and furthermore
that in some instances, DDU administrators might wx'll have

been administering the program as

a

welfare-oriented "needs”

type of policy without explicit reference to the primary

criterion of medically ascertained disability so severe as
to prevent a claimant from engaging in substantial gainful

act ivi ty

The first part of the analysis centered on the actual

decision-making process, the so-called "sequential analysis,"
w^ithin which DDU’s administrators operate in making decisions

about each claim for benefit aivards.

The three stages in

the decision-making process are concerned with the follov/ing

types of cases:

(1)

medically- ascertainable severe dis-

abilities v;hich can be categorized under one of the types
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of disability listed in the Handbook for Phvsicians;

(2)

equivalent to" cases, i.e., disabilities whose combined

severity equal

a

specific listing

n the Handbook

;

and (3)

cases of moderately severe disability (about 60 to 70 per-

cent of the total number)

,

which do not meet the listings

in the Flandbook and which therefore require greater use of

the criteria of "residual functional capacity" and "sub-

stantial gainful activity" in order for disability examiners
to determine whether or not these claimants should receive

disability benefit awards.
Each of the successive stages in the decision-m.aking

process results in further complications and increasing room
for interpretation for examiners.

Although respondents

agreed that the first stage of the sequential analysis is
quite routine, they noted that already in the second stage
there are the problems of "equivalency" of disabilities,
the need to consult physicians on doubtful cases, and the

The fact

determinations of residual functional capacity.

that medical consultants do not at all times agree with one

another of the merits of particular cases adds

a

further

complication for the disability examiners.
It

is in the third stage of the decision-making

process, however, where the majority of the disability cases
are found, that the clearest opportunities for differing

interpretations among examiners arise.

Here examiners face

the most difficult decisions, because "residual functional
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capacity" and "substantial gainful activity" come to play
a

role that is at least as significant as the medical

severity of the disability of the claimant.

Consequently,

whether the disability program is administered uniformly
among the states as an insurance program or whether it is

transformed, at least partially, into

a

"needs" oriented

program will be decided at this stage in the decision-making
process.

To be sure, statutory and administrative regula-

tions function as

a

context within which the administrator

must operate even at this stage of the sequential analysis.
However, they do not preclude him from selectively applying
the regulations when he thinks that the situation demands
it.

Furthermore, if the standards are ambiguous or are

considered "unrealistic" by the DDU administrators, then
this only serves to compound the problems associated with
the notion of substantial gainful activity.
In Chapter Six,

a

short history of the controversy

over the problem of defining "substantial gainful activity"
It was

was presented.

noted there that

a

1967 Congressional

amendment attempted to solve the problem by stipulating that
the "national economy" was to be the area in which SGA

might be sought for

a

claimant.

However, it also specif ieo.

that factors such as "age," "education, y and "work experi-

ence" should be taken into consideration in determining

whether or not

a

claimant could be expected to engage in

su bstantial gainful employment.

Both the problems of
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"unrealistic” and ambiguous standards were manifested in this
attempt to clarify the notion of SGA, and this has conse-

quently affected the manner of implementation of the Disability Insurance program among the states.
In regard to the "national economy" standard, most

administrators in the DDU’s have simply refused to follow

it

and have substituted their own particular states as the

proper location for determining the existence of substantial
gainful activity that

a

claimant could perform.

Furthermore,

the seeming inability to define precisely such notions as
age,

education, and previous work experience in an

a

priori

abstract manner has provided DDU examiners with the opportunity
of allowing benefits to be granted to claimants even if the

severity of their disability does not warrant such

a

decision.

As the analysis from the interviews indicated, some DDU

administrators seemed to be more concerned with whether
claimants would actually find employment than with the question of their employability per se.

This tension was

brought out in the discussion of the use of the Directory of
Occ\ipat ional Titles

(DOT)

by state disability examiners.

Many persons interviewed seemed to feel that this index of
the availability of various types of jobs in a state was

not very valuable because it was not a realistic indicator
of the availability of particular jobs which any particular

claimant could perform.

Although no rigid conclusions are

warranted here, one must w'onder

how^

lenient an administrator
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can become before an insurance oriented program, with strict

standards concerning the severity of disability as

a

criterion

for awarding of benefits, has been transformed into somethirg

that resembles more clearly a needs oriented program where
the issue is whether or not a claimant is actually employed.

The flexibility of administrative regulations, however, was only one factor in explaining the variability in
the implementation of the disability program among the states.

The professional quality of the administrators themselves

seemed to be another primary cause.

The analysis showed that

background and qualification of examiners and length of
service of examiners with the DDU's varied sufficiently to

suggest that professionalism was directly related to the

specific percentages of disability benefit awards among the
states.

Furthermore, there was some evidence to indicate

that age and social attitudes of the DDU administrators

might have an impact upon the types of decisions made.
The analysis of the role of the DDU administrators
in the implementation of the program thus has substantiated

the conclusions gleaned from the discussion in the earlier

chapters on the nature of federalism, the history of the

disability program, and the impact of socio-economic, input,
and general political system variables.^ Although conclusions

would
must be tentative because of the nature of the data, it
seem that responses gained from those persons interviewed
the DDU
have indicated strongly the active presence of

168

administrators in determining the types of decisions that are
made in the implementation of the program and in many instances the specific criteria to be utilized in arriving at

specific decisions to award or to deny benefits to claimants.
This has proven to be true especially in the third stage of
the sequential analysis where flexibility of decision-making

standards and low degree of administrative professionalism

may combine to transform the explicit purposes of an insurance program into

a

covert needs oriented policy.

Whatever the consequences for the integrity of the

Disability Insurance program, the substantial role of the
DDU's in the implementation of the disability program serves

only to indicate witli even greater force the importance of
the states in the operation of the American federal system.

Even beyond the actual impact of the state DDU’s on the variance in the percentage of disability benefit allowances, the

analysis in Chapter Six pointed to the areas of personnel
policy, budgetary matters, and relationships with the state

Vocational Rehabilitation Agencies and the DDU's, where
additional state influence could be brought to bear upon
the operation of the disability program in the states.

It

would seem to be true indeed that "partnership" and "negotiated coordination" are quite viable concepts in the analysis of any major policy area, even one in which the states,
at first glance,

do not seem to have a major role to play.

.
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